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I. INTRODUCTION 
The Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) 1 requires drug 
and medical device manufacrurers to investigate and report to the United 
States Food and Drug Administration (FDA) incidents involving their 
products, even though personal injuries may not have resulted.2 After 
the necessary reports are filed, third parties may seek discovery of the 
reports under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)3 or directly from 
the manufacturer if litigation ensues. Thus, the compliance efforts of a 
drug or medical device manufacturer may be used against it by a litigant 
in a products liability action. Despite substantial civil and criminal 
penalties that may be imposed on drug and medical device manufacturers 
failing to report product complaints, malfunctions, or defects,4 wide-
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1. 21 u.s.c. §§ 301-95 (1994). 
2. See infra notes 124-53 and accompanying text 
3. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1994); see infra notes 157-73, 186-206 and accompanying 
text. 
4. A drug or device manufacturer that fails to comply with its reporting 
requiremencs under the FDCA may be liable for substmtial fines or may be subject to 
injunction proceedings, product seizure, denial or withdrawal of marketing approval, 
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spread underreporting exists in this area.S primarily due to the specter 
of products liability exposure.6 
Because the attorney-client privilege and the work-product doctrine are 
inadequate to protect the FDA-required internal product-safety analyses 
performed by drug and medical device manufacturers,7 commentators 
have suggested that the emerging common-law privilege of self-critical 
analysis8 is another possible alternative to preserve the confidentiality 
recall, or imprisorunerit. See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. §§ 331-335c, 355(e), 360e(e), 360f, 
360h(o); 21 C.F.R. pt. 7 & §§ 314.80(k), 314.8l(d), 814.45, 814.46 {1996), 
5. See Alan C. Miller, Medical Device Defects Held to Go Unreported, L.A. 
TIMES, Nov. 3, 1989, at Al; see also Center for Devices & Radiological Health Home 
Page (visited Mar. 5, 1996) <http://www.fda.gov/cdrb/mdrinfo.html>. 
6. See Jonathan S. Kahan, Reporting of Substantial Product Hazards Under 
Section 15 of the Consumer Product Safety Act, 30 ADMIN. L. REv. 289, 309 (1978) 
(noting that fear of products liability exposure is ''perhaps the most important negative 
incentive to reporting"); Timothy D. Zick, Note, Reporting Substantial Product Safety 
Hazards Under the Consumer Product Safety Act: The Products Liability Interface, 80 
GEO. L.J. 387, 389-90 & nn.9-10, 396 (1991). 
7. See infra notes 24-52 and accompanying text. 
8. The self-critical analysis privilege bas been referred to variously by courts and 
commentators as the "self..critica! subjective analysis privilege," e.g., ftt re Burlington 
N., Inc., 679 F.2d 762, 765 (8th Cir. 1982); the "self-critical analysis defense," e.g., 
Webb v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 81 F.RD. 431,433 (E.D. Pa. 1978); the "critical 
seJt:.analysis privilege,'' e.g., Witten v. A.H. Smith & Co., 100 F.R.D. 446,449 (D. Md, 
1984), a.ff'd, 785 F. 2d 306 (4th Cir. 1986); the "self-criticism privilege," e.g., S. Kay 
McNab, Note, Criticizi11g the Self-Criticism Privilege, 1987 U. ILL. L. REv. 675, 683-88 
(1987); the "self-examination privilege," e.g., Rosario v. New York Times Co., 84 
F.R.D. 626, 631 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); the "self-evaluation privilege," e.g., Hoffman v. 
United Telecomms., Inc., 117 F.R.D. 440, 442 (D. Kan. 1987); the "self-evaluative 
privilege," e.g., Joseph E. Murphy, The Self-Evaluative Privilege, 1 J. CORP. L. 489 
(1982); Joseph E. Murphy & Roselee M. Oyer, The Self-Evaluative Privilege and 
Beyond, INSIOHTS, Mar. 1993, at 11, available in WESTLAW, lnsit Database; John 
Calvin Conway, Note, Self-Evaluative Privilege and Corporate Compliance Audits, 68 
S. CAL. L. REV. 621 (1995); Robert J. Bush, Comment, Stimulating Corporate Self 
Regulation-11ie Corporate Self-Evaluative Privilege: Paradigmatic Preferentialism or 
Pragmatic Panacea, 87 NW. U.L. REV. 597 (1993); Nancy C. Crisman & Arthur F. 
Mathews, Limited Waiver of Attorney-Client Privilege and Work-Product Doctrine in 
Internal Corporate Investigations: An Emerging Corporate ''Self-Evaluative" Privile1e, 
21 AM. CRIM, L. REv. 123 (1983); the "privilege for confidential self-evaluative 
analysis," e.g., Westmoreland v. CBS, Inc., 97 F.RD. 703, 705 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); the 
"self-evaluative report privilege," e.g., Clyde C. Kahrl, Comment, The Attorney-Client 
Privileie, the Self-Evaluative Report Privilege, and Diversified Industries, Inc. v. 
Meredith, 40 Omo Sr. L.J. 699 (1979); the "qualified privilege for self-evaluative 
documents," e.g., Reynolds Metals Co. v. Rumsfeld, 564 F.2d 663,667 (4th Cir. 1977); 
the "privilege against disclosure of self-evaluative documents," e.g., Emerson Elec. Co. 
v. Schlesinger, 609 F.2d 898, 906-07 (8th Cir. 1979); the "self-critical privilege," e.g., 
United States v. Dexter Corp., 132 F.R.D. 8, 9 (D. Conn. 1990); the "privilege of critical 
self-examination," e.g., Stuart E. Rickerson, The Privilege of Critical Self-Examination: 
How To Raise and Use It, 58 DEF. CoUNS. J. 504, 507 (1991); the "peer review 
privilege," e.g., Pagano v. Oroville Hosp., 145 F.R.D. 683, 690 (E.D. Cal. 1993); and 
the "public policy privilege," e.g. , Lynne Charlotte Hennle, Note, A Bo!Ollced Approach 
to Affirmative Action Discovery in Title VII Suits, 32 HAsTINGS L.J. 1013, 1024 (1981). 
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of these self-analytical reports. Authors of myriad cases and commentar-
ies over the past twenty-five years have debated the viability of this 
evolving, nascent9 privilege. Originating in a medical peer review 
context, the privilege modernly has been af plied to corporate self-critical 
studies in a variety of different settings.1 
If applied, the self-critical analysis privilege prevents disclosure of 
self-evaluative material when the public interest in maintaining 
confidentiality outweighs the public's need for full discovery.11 Ideally, 
assertion of the privilege would protect a corporation's internal 
investigations and resulting self-analytical reports from discovery, even 
though such documents admittedly may be highly relevant to a lawsuit. 
Commentators argue that without the privilege, which "is intended to 
promote the societal goal of encouraging candid appraisal of problems 
as an aid to implementing beneficial cbange,"12 a "chilling effect" on 
such self-analyses would result. 13 
Despite the privilege's origins over twenty-five years ago and resultant 
wide-spread application in the 1970s and 1980s,'4 its evolution has 
been impeded by two competing societal interests: a general policy 
9. Numerous courts and commentators have referred to this privilege as "nascent" 
See, e.g., Bush, supra note 8, at 602,603; Note, The Privilege of Self-Critical Analysis, 
96 Harv. L. Rev. 1083, 1087 (1983} [bereinafter Harvard Note}; Crisman & Mathews,. 
supra note 8, at 171; Wylie v. Mills, 478 A.2d 1273, 1276 (N.J. Super. Ct Law Div. 
1984). 
IO. See infra notes 62-71 and accompanying text 
11. See, e.g., Wylie, 478 A.2d at 1276; Roberts v. National Detroit Corp., 87 
F.R.D. 30, 32 (E.D. Mich. 1980). 
12. David J. Beck, What's Happening in the Law: SJUVeying the New Develop-
ments, Business Litigation 60 DEF. COUNS. J. 357, 358 (1993). 
13. Commentators have referred to a "dual chilling effect" First, corporations 
faced with potential litigation and possible punitive damages exposure are less likely to 
compile potentially damaging ''paper trails" or ''road maps" for plaintiff's lawyers. 
Second, aware that damaging infonnation could lead to reprisals sbould liability result, 
individuals within the corporation will be reluctant to be candid without an assurance of 
confidentiality. See Harvard Note, supra note 9 at 1091-93; Beck, supra note 12, at 358; 
see also Bush, supra note 8 at 634-35, 637; Conway, supra note 8, at 635-37, 657-59; 
Paul B. Taylor, Note, Encouraging Product Safety Testing by Applying the Privilege of 
Self-Critical Analysis When Punitive Damages are Sought, 16 HARv, J.L. & PUB. PoL'Y 
769, 796-97 (1993); James T. O'Reilly, Environmental Audit Privileges: The Need for 
Legislative Recognition, 19 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 119, 124, 126, 133 (1994); David P. 
Leonard, Codifying a Privilege for Self-Critical Analysis, 25 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. I 13, 
117 {1988) [hereinafter Leonard, Codijj,ing a Privilege]; Peter A. Gish, The Self-Critical 
Analysis Privilege and Environmental Audit Reports, 25 ENvTL. L. 73, 80 & n.38 
(1995). 
14. See infra notes 62-71 and accompanying text. 
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favoring the free flow of information and the litigant's right to liberal 
discovery.15 These opposing interests have led to inconsistent applica-
tions of the privilege by the courts, which must balance the equities in 
each particular case before applying the privilege. 16 The growing trend 
by the courts is to construe the self-critical analysis privilege narrowly 
either by severely limiting its application or by questioning its existence 
and refusing to apply the privilege at all. 17 Such judicial disfavor has 
resulted in an inconsistent case-by-case approach, leading to unpredict-
able outcomes for corporations relying on the privilege to maintain the 
confidentiality of their self-analytical documents. 
Because of the unsettled nature of this emerging privilege, businesses 
and commentators recently have clamored for legislation creating a 
qualified statutory privilege for internal self-analyses.18 While several 
model statutes have been proposed, only one state has enacted legislation 
that encourages self-critical analysis by product manufacturers, with the 
Widerlying goal of encouraging product-safety innovation for consumers' 
benefit and protection. 19 
Although the self-critical analysis privilege seems especially important 
in the drug and medical device industry where product perfonnance is 
continually monitored by critical self-evaluation and is crucial to the 
15. See, e.g., Harvard Note, supra note 9, at 1084; Bush, supra note 8, at 603; 
Gish, supra note 13, at 77, 80, 75 n.8 ("The competing policy considerations of a 
plaintiff's interest in full and complete discovery and a defendant's interest in privacy 
and confidentiality have Jong been a source of debate in the Jaw of privileges."); Beck, 
supra note 12, at 358-60; David P. Leonard, An Emerging Pn·vilege for Self-Critical 
Analysis, 14 LmGATION I, 3 (Spring 1988) [hereinafter Leonard, An Emerging 
Privilege]. 
16. See, e.g., Harvard Note, supra note 9, at 1087, 1091; Bush, supra note 8, at 
607-08; Gish, supra note 13, at 77; Leonard, An Emerging Privilege, supra note 15, at 
3. 
17. See infra notes 101-17 and accompanying text. 
18. See, e.g., Harvard Note, supra note 9, at 1085 n.11; Bush, supra note 8, at 
641-45; Murphy, supra note 8, at 499-502; Murphy & Oyer, supra note 8, at 15; 
Crisman & Mathews, supra note 8, at 172-74; Leonard, An Emerging Privilege, suP..ra 
note 15, at 58-59; Leonard, Codifying a Privilege, supra note 15, at 123-25; O'Reilly, 
supra note 13, at 141-46 (creating qualified privilege for environmental audits). 
19. In perhaps the most aggressive move toward codifying this common-law 
privilege, Arizona recently enacted legislation that encourages self-critical analysis for 
products manufacturers and forges the path of the privilege away from a discovery 
prohibition and toward an evidentiary restriction. Under the Arizona legislation, a 
qualified evidentiary privilege prohibits the ultimate admissibility-not the 
discoverability--ofself-analyticai product-safety reviews. See ARIZ. REV. STAT,§ 12-
681 (West 1992); id. § 12-687 (West Supp. 1996); see also John Kaites, Encouraging 
Safety Innovation Through Self-Critical Analysis, LEADER'S PRODUCT LIABILl1Y LAW 
AND STRATEGY 3 (July 1995). 
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preservation of human life,20 that industry is subject to the liberal 
public disclosure requirements of the FOIA. Because neither Congress 
nor the FDA has exempted product-safety analyses from public 
disclosure, it is unlikely that the courts or state legislatures will extend 
the privilege to protect such information from discovery by a litigant. 
Consequently, drug and medical device manufacturers will not be 
released from their current Hobson's choice: comply with the stringent 
FDA reporting requirements, or fail to do so in an effort to curtail the 
products liability and punitive damages exposure21 resulting from public 
disclosure of their product-related safety reports. 
This Article analyzes the inapplicability of the self-critical analysis 
privilege to the drug and medical device industry. Part II traces the 
historical development of the privilege and the increasing judicial 
reluctance to expand the privilege beyond the medical peer review 
context. Part III outlines the drug and medical device reporting 
requirements under the FDCA. Part IV provides an overview of both 
the public disclosure requirements under the FOIA and its counterpart 
requirements under the FDCA and argues that application of the 
privilege to the drug and medical device industry is federally preempted. 
Finally, in Part V, the Article concludes that the strong public interests 
of liberal discovery and the right to access government records do not 
justify expansion of the self-critical analysis privilege to product-safety 
analyses submitted to the FDA by the drug and medical device industry. 
Il. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF TIIE SELF-CRITICAL 
ANALYSIS PRIVILEGE 
Unlike the well-established and widely recognized attorney-client 
privilege and work-product doctrine, the self-critical analysis privilege 
is of relatively recent common-law origin. Although strong precedent 
exists for applying this nascent privilege to reviews generated by medical 
peer reviews, many courts are hesitant to extend the privilege to other 
types of internal self~critical reviews due to the long-standing judicial 
20. See James F. Flanagan, Rejecting a General Privilege for Self-Critical 
Analyses, 51 GEO, WASH. L. REV, 551,571 (1983). 
21. See generally David G. Owen, Problems in Assessing Punitive Damages 
Against Manufacturers of Defective Products, 49 U. cm. L. REY. l (1982); Taylor, 
supra note 13. 
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reluctance to recognize any new privilege absent a statute.22 This 
reluctance has resulted in inconsistent, ad hoc applications of the 
privilege. 
A. Genealogy of the Self-Critical Analysis Privilege: 
The Attorney-Based Protections 
The traditional attorney-based protections-the attorney-client privilege 
and the work-product doctrine-represent the earliest genealogy of the 
self-critical analysis privilege.23 Although certain types of self-
analytical materials may be safeguarded by the attorney-client privilege 
or the work-product doctrine, neither offers adequate security because, 
in most cases, the information sought does not meet the requirements of 
either type of protection.24 
1. The Attorney-Client Privilege 
Under the well-established attorney-client privilege,25 confidential 
attorney-client communications are absolutely privileged from disclo-
sure.26 Absent this inveterate privilege, full and frank disclosures of all 
22. See, e.g., O'Reilly, supra note 13, at 131, 148; Eli Lilly & Co. v. Marshall, 
850 S.W.2d 155, 162 & n.3 (Tex. 1993) (Doggett, J., dissenting) ("(M]ostjurisdictions 
exercise judicial restraint by interpreting statutes rather than enacting new privileges."); 
Lamitie v. Emerson Elec. Co., 535 N.Y.S.2d 650, 653 (App. Div. 1988); Scroggins v. 
Uniden Corp. of Am., 506 N.E.2d 83, 86 Qnd. Ct. App. 1987); DeMoss Rexall Drugs 
v. Dobson, 540 N.E.2d 655, 657 Qnd. Ct. App. 1989). 
23. See Murphy & Oyer, supra note 8, at 13 ("The work-product concept of 
protecting another party's review and analysis, and the attorney-client privilege policy 
of encouraging compliance with law, are all roots of this privilege,") 
24. See Leonard, Cod(fj,ing a Privilege, supra note 13, at 120-22. See generally 
Crisman & Mathews, supra note 8 (discussing limitations of the attorney-client privilege 
and work-product doctrine when applied to corporate self-evaluative investigations), 
25. The attorney-client privilege is the oldest privilege for confidential communica-
tions. See 8 JOHN H. WIGMORE, WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE, § 2290, at 547 (McNaughton 
ed., 3d ed. 1940). 
26. See 8 WIGMORE, supra note 25, § 2292, at 558; Diversified Indus., Inc. v. 
Meredith, 572 F.2d 596, 601 (8th Cir. 1977) (en bane) (acknowledging the "long-
established rule that confidential communications between an attorney and his client are 
absolutely privileged from disclosure against the will of the client''). The attorney-client 
privilege remains a common-law privilege in the federal system. Congress rejected 
proposed Rules 502-513 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, which contained a specific 
provision recognizing the attorney-client privilege. See 10 JAMES W. MOORE, MOORE'S 
FEDERAL PRACTICE§ 500.03, at V-4 to V-5 (2d ed. 1996); 8 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT 
ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2020, at 312-13 (2d ed. 1994). 
Communications between attorney and client are not privileged, however, where the 
advice is sought in furtherance of a crime or fraud. See 4 MOORE, supra, t 26.11 [2], 
at26-J88 to 26-190 (2d ed. 1996); WRIGHT ET AL., supra,§ 2017, at 257. 
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relevant information between attorney and client would be curtailed.27 
This rationale is similar to that underlying the self-critical analysis 
privilege. 
The Supreme Court's opinion in Upjohn Co. v. United States28 is 
touted as the «seminal articulation" of the corporate attorney-client 
privilege.2!> In Upjohn, the Court unanimously rejected a restrictive 
interpretation of the attorney-client privilege because such a narrow 
reading threatened "to limit the valuable efforts of corporate counsel to 
ensure their client's compliance with the law."30 The Court affirmed 
the strong public policy underlying the protection of internal corporate 
compliance efforts31 when it acknowledged that corporate clients need 
to consult lawyers because of the "vast and complicated array of 
regulatory legislation confronting the modem corporation."32 Similarly, 
the fundamental goal underlying the self-critical analysis privilege is to 
encourage corporate self-evaluation and self-correction by assuring the 
confidentiality of such actions. 33 
The attorney-client privilege, however, protects only the confidential 
communication itself. Neither the underlying information nor the self-
27. See 4 MOORE, supra note 26, 'if 26.11[2], at 26-174. The policy underlying the 
attorney-client privilege is to encourage a client to be forthright with his or her attorney 
without apprehension of compelled disclosure by the attorney. See Upjohn Co. v. United 
States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981) (noting that the purpose of the attorney-client privilege 
is to promote "full and frank communication between attorneys and their clients and 
thereby promote broader public interests in the observance of law and administration of 
justice"); see also S WIGMORE, supra note 25, § 2291, at 550. 
28. 449 U.S. 383 (1981). 
29. See Bush, supra note 8, at 616. 
30. 449 U.S. at 392. In Up john, the IRS had attempted to obtain a company-wide 
internal review directed by Upjohn's general counsel to investigate whether the company 
was involved in making improper payments to foreign government officials. 
3 L See Murphy & Oyer, supra note 8, at 13. As one commentator noted, the 
Upjohn decision ''very easily could have become the cornerstone of the critical self-
examination privilege." See Rickerson, supra note 8, at 507. 
32. 449 U.S. at 392 (noting that compliance with such legislation ''is hardly an 
instinctive matter''). 
33. See Murphy, supra note 8, at 496. The Upjohn Court, however, did not 
resolve the dilemma llllderlying the self-critical anaJysis privilege: the corporation's 
desire to maintain the confidentiality of self-evaluative activities while attempting to 
comply with its regulatory agency's need to access such infonnation. See Crisman & 
Mathews, supra note 8, at 126. In such cases, the legislature and courts should not 
''tinker'' with the traditional attorney-based privileges. "Rather, Congress should focus 
directly on whether it should grant corporations a carefully tailored self-evaluative 
privilege designed to promote maximum law compliance at minimum cost .... " Id. at 
127. 
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critical evaluations of a client are protected.34 Additionally, the 
privilege does not attach to information obtained by an attorney from 
public documents3s or from third parties.36 Another drawback of the 
attorney-client privilege in the context of internal corporate evaluations 
is that the privilege can be waived easily.37 Even limited disclosure of 
otherwise rrivileged information to government agencies may be deemed 
a waiver.3 Moreover, the "veil of secrecy'' imposed by the attorney-
client privilege is not practical with such compliance efforts, which are 
primarily educational and motivational.39 Yet another limitation of the 
34. See EDWARD w. CLEARY ET AL., McCoRMICK ON EVIDENCE§ 89, at 213-14 
(3d ed. 1984) [hereinafter MCCORMICK: ON Ev:IDENCE.]; 8 WIOMORE, supra note 25, 
§ 2306, at 589-90; 4 MOORE, supra note 26, ,i 26.11[2], at 26-178 to 26-179. See also 
Leonard, Codifying a Privilege, supra note 13, at 121; Conway, supra note 8, at 632. 
35. See WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 26, § 2017, at 266-67. See, e.g., American 
Cyanamid Co. v. Hercules Powder Co., 211 F. Supp. 85, 89-90 (D. Del. 1962) (refusing 
to extend attorney-client privilege to documents consisting of analyses of patents, claims, 
and products manufactured under patents where such infonnation was on file in the 
patent office and thus public). 
36. See 8 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 26, § 2017, at 266-67. See, e.g., FTC v. 
TRW, Inc., 628 F.2d ;207, 211 (D.C. Cir. 1980), ajf'g479 F. Supp. 160 (D.D.C. 1979) 
(holding attorney-client privilege inapflicable to independent compilation1erfonned by 
outside company); Franks v. Nationa Dairy Prods. Corp., 41 F.R.D. 23 , 237-38 (D. 
Tex. 1966) (refusing to apply attorney-client privilege to report by testing laboratory in 
products liability case). But see United States v. Kovel, 296 F.2d 918, 921-22 (2d Cir. 
1961) (recognizing attomey-client privilege can attach to accountant's report made at 
attorney's request for purpose of translating client's infonnation into usable form for the 
attorney); United States v. Alvarez, 519 F.2d 1036, 1045-46 (3d Cir. 1975) (according 
attorney-client privilege to psychiatrist hired by attorney to aid in preparation of insanity 
defense); United States v. Cote, 456 F.2d 142, 144 (8th Cir. 1972) (upholding attorney-
client privilege to audit prepared by accountant at attorney's request to aid in advising 
client whether to file aniended tax return). 
37. See 8 WIGMORE, supra note 25, § 2311, at 600, § 2327, at 630; 4 MOORE, 
supra note 26, "ii 26.11(2], at 26-185 to 26-187. A party must zealously protect the 
confidentiality of communications with counsel to prevent waiver of the privilege. Even 
inadvertent disclosure can result in waiver. See, e.g., In re Sealed Case, 877 F.2d 976, 
980 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (indicating that a party must "treat the confidentiality of attomey-
client communications like jewels-if not crown jewels"), 
38. See, e.g., In re Steinhardt Partners, 9 F.3d 230, 235-36 (2d Cir. 1993) (holding 
voluntary submission to SEC waived privilege); In re Sealed Case, 877 F.2d at 980-81 
(holding voluntary disclosure of document during routine government audit waived 
privilege in subsequent action for fraud and tax evasion); In re Subpoenas Duces Tecum, 
738 F.2d 1367 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (holding attorney-client privilege waived by voluntary 
disclosure of self-evaluative materia1s to SEC); Pennian Corp. v. United States, 665 
F.2d 1214, 1215 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (holding attorney-client privilege and work-product 
doctrine waived by voluntary disclosure of self-evaluative materials to SEC), But see 
Donovan v. Teamsters Union Local 25, 103 F.R.D. 550, 553 (D. Mass. 1984) (preserving 
privilege where disclosure to government compelled by law). 
39. See Mutpby & Oyer, supra note 8, at 13. See, e.g,, FfC v. TRW, Inc., 479 
F. Supp. 160, 163 (D.D.C. 1979) (rejecting application of attorney-client privile~e for 
an internal compliance review because the findings of the :revie\v "were sufficiently 
circulated within TRW as to negate the intention of confidentiality''). 
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attorney-client privilege is that it does not apply when the in-house 
attorney, who regularly wears several hats, is performing work that 
requires management expertise rather than work that requires legal 
acumen.40 Nor is it practical or cost-effective to utilize attorneys for 
routine compliance efforts.41 And even if an attorney is included in 
such efforts, there is no guarantee that the privilege will protect the 
evaluative reports from disclosure.42 Consequently, the attorney-client 
privilege does not provide reliable protection for mOst self-analytical 
documents. 
2. The Work-Product Doctrine 
Like the attorney-client privilege, the work-product doctrine has an 
extensive history, tracing its origins to the 1947 Supreme Court decision 
in Hickman v. Taylor.43 The doctrine subsequently was codified in 
Rule 26(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,44 and the 
majority of states have adopted identical or substantially similar work-
product statutes.45 The work-product doctrine is not technically a 
privilege. Rather, the doctrine offers qualified protection to an attorney's 
work product prepared for trial or "in anticipation of litigation."46 Such 
protection, however, is not absolute: it may yield where a party seeking 
disclosure shows "substantial need" for the information and shows 
40. See WRIGHT ET AL, supra note 26, § 2017, at 260-61; Mmphy, supra note 8, 
at 497; Leonard, An Emerging Privilege, supra note 15, at 3. See, e.g., Resnick v, 
American Dental Ass'n, 95 F,R.D. 372,375 (N.D. Ill. 1982) (holding that the privilege 
will not be extended to management-oriented work done for overall business pmposes 
performed by an attorney where the attorney-client relationship was only ''tangential" to 
the work); In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 599 F.2d 504, 510 (2d Cir. 1979) (holding that 
privilege did not apply to fact-finding by an attorney retained for that purpose); 
Diversified Indus., Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596, 602 (8th Cir. 1977) (holding that for 
communication to be privileged, it must be made to obtain legal advice from an attorney 
retained for that purpose); see also 8 WIGMORE, supra note 25, § 2296, at 569. 
41. See Murphy & Oyer, supra note 8, at 14; O'Reilly, supra note 13, at 136-38; 
Murphy, supra note 8, at 497. 
42. See Conway, supra note 8, at 632-33; Reich v. Hercules, Inc., 857 F. Supp. 
367,372 (D.N.J. 1994) (rejecting claim of attorney-client privilege by corporation that 
included attorney to conduct internal audit reports). 
43. 329 U.S. 495 (1947). 
44. See infra note 47. 
45. See WRIGIIT ET AL., supra note 26, § 2023, at 334-35 nn.27-28. 
46. See FED. R Crv. P. 26(b)(3). As the Hiclanan Court noted, "[d]iscovery was 
hardly intended to enable a learned profession to perform its functions ... on wits 
borrowed from the adversary." 329 U.S. at 516. 
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inability to obtain the information elsewhere without suffering "undue 
hardship.'"'7 Furthermore, the requirement that the information be 
compiled "in anticipation of litigation" has been interpreted narrowly.48 
Reports made in the regular course of business fall outside of the work-
product protection.49 
Similar to the attorney-client privilege, the work-product doctrine has 
its shortfalls when applied to self-analytical reports. One of the primary 
purposes underlying corporate compliance efforts is to prevent litiga-
47. An attorney's work product may be discovered ''upon a showing that the party 
seeking discovery bas substantial need of the materials in the preparation of the party's 
case and that the party is unable without undue hardship to obtain the substantial 
equivalent of the materials by other means." FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(3); see also 
Hickman, 329 U.S. at 511-12. As with the attorney-client privilege, a crime-fraud 
exception applies to the work-product doctrine. See 4 MOORE, supra note 26, ,i 
26.15[4], at 26-324 to 26-326. 
48. See WRJGHT ET AL., supra note 26, § 2024, at 338-43 nn.7-10; 4 MOORE, 
supra note 26, '!126.15[2], at 26-296. See, e.g., Martin v. Baily's Park Place Hotel & 
Casino, 983 F.2d 1252, 1260 (3d Cir. 1993) (holding that "anticipation of litigation" test 
looks to whether party claiming work-product protection has reasonable unilateral belief 
that litigation will ensue); National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Murray Sheet Metal Co., 967 
F.2d 980, 984 (4th Cir. 1992) ("'[T]he mere fact that litigation does eventually ensue 
does not, by itself, cloak materials' with work product immunity •... The document 
must be prepared because of the prospect of litigation when the preparer faces an actual 
or a potential claim following an actual event or series of events that reasonably could 
result in litigation.'') (emphasis omitted) (quoting Binks Mfg. Co. v. National Presto 
Indus., Inc. 709 F.2d 1109, 118 (7th Cir. 1983)); Garfinkle v. Arcata Nat'! Corp., 64 
F.R.D. 688, 690 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (holding remote possibility oflitigation is insufficient); 
Flores v, Fourth Court of Appeals, 777 S.W.2d 38, 41 (Tex. 1989) (holding investiga-
tions are not made in anticipation of litigation unless litigation is "imminent''); National 
Tanlc Co. v. Brotherton, 851 S.W.2d 193, 204 (Tex. 1993) (holding anticipation of 
litigation test met where reasonable person believes there is "a substantial chance of 
litigation"). 
49. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(3) advisory committee's note (1970 amendment) 
("Materials assembled in the ordinary course of business, or pursuant to public 
requirements unrelated to litigation, or for other nonlitigation purposes are not under the 
qualified immunity provided by this subdivision.") See, e.g., Sanders v. Alabama State 
Bar, 161 F.R.D. 470,473 (D. Ala. 1995) (holding that even where litigation is already 
a prospect, documents prepared in regular course of business, rather than for purpose of 
litigation, are not privileged under work-product doctrine); Simon v. G.D. Searle & Co., 
816 F.2d 397, 403 (8th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 917 (1987) (holding risk~ 
management docwnents prepared to keep track of and anticipate costs of products 
liability litigation not protected work product); Smith v. Conway Org., Inc., 154 F.R.D. 
73, 78 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (holding that where a party or its attorney prepares a document 
in the ordinary course of business, it will not be protected work product, even if party 
believes that document may be useful in the event litigation ensues); Harper v. Auto-
Owners Ins. Co., 138 F.R.D. 655, 662-63 (D. Ind. 1991) (holding a docwnent prepared 
by an insurer to evaluate an insured's claim in the ordinary course of business was not 
protected work product even if prepared after litigation was reasonably anticipated 
because "it is the very nature of an insurer's business to investigate and evaluate the 
merits of claims"), 
(VOL. 34: 93, 1997] Self-Critical Analysis Privilege 
SAN DIEGO LAW REVll:W 
tion.50 Thus, while self-critical studies performed at the request of an 
attorney for purposes of trial preparation might be protected from 
discovery, many routine compliance efforts do not possess the requisite 
tie to litigation to invoke work-product protection. Additionally, like the 
attorney-client privilege, protection under the work -product doctrine does 
not extend to facts that can be ileaned from protected documents, 51 and 
the protection may be waived. 
B. Common-Law Origins of the Self-Critical Analysis Privilege 
Although the self-critical analysis privilege can trace itS' roots to the 
attorney-based protections, courts and scholars have attributed the 
common-law origins of the self-critical analysis privilege to a 1970 
federal district court opinion.53 In Bredice v. Doctors Hospital, Inc.,54 
50. See Murphy & Oyer, supra note 8, at 14; see also O'Reilly, supra note 13, at 
138-39. 
51. See Hic/anan, 329 U.S. at 511 (1947); see also WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 26, 
§ 2023, at 330-33, § 2024, at 337. 
52. See supra note 38 and accompanying texL See, e.g., In re Leslie Fay Cos. Sec. 
Litig., 152 F.R.D. 42, 45 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (refusing to extend work-product immunity 
where corporation's audit committee voluntarily disclosed report to SEq; In re Worlds 
of Wonder Sec. Litig., 147 F.R.D. 208, 212 (N.D. Cal. 1992) (holding work-product 
immunity waived by voluntarily producing documents to SEC, even where corporation 
expressly reserved all of its rights and submitted the information confidentially), But 
because the primary goal of the work-product doctrine is to protect the adversary 
process, as opposed to protecting a cJient's confidences, disclosure ofwork product to 
a third party does not necessarily waive work-product protection. See 4 MOORE, supra 
note 26, "iJ26.15[4], at26-322 to 26-324; WRIGHT ET AL.,supra note 26, § 2024, at 367-
69. 
53. See, e.g., Taylor, supra note 13, at 799; Bush, supra note 8, at 603; Crisman 
& Mathews, supra note 8, at 171-72; Beck, supra note 12, at 358; Harvard Note, supra 
note 9, at 1087; Murphy, supra note 8, at 490; Murphy & Oyer, supra note 8, at II; 
Jean D. Reed, Comment, Corporate Self-Investigations Under the Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act, 41 U. CHI. L. REV, 803, 820-21 (1980); Comment, Civil Procedure: Self-
Evaluative Reports-A Qualified Privilege in Discovery?, 51 MrnN. L REV. 807, 814 
(1973); O'Reiliy,supra note 13, at 148; Zick,supra note 6, at401; Flanagan.supra note 
20, at 552 n.8; Gish, supra note 13, at 78; Leonard, Codifying a Privilege, supra note 
13, at 117; Rickerson, supra note 8, at 505; Dowling v. American Hawaii Cruises, Inc., 
971 F.2d 423,426 n.1 (9th Cir. 1992); Shipes v. Bic Corp., 154 F.RD. 301,306 n.4 
(M.D. Ga. 1994); In re Grand Juty Proceedings, 861 F. Supp. 386, 387 (D. Md. 1994); 
FTC v. TRW, Inc., 628 F.2d 207,210 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Combined Communications 
Corp. v. Public Serv. Co., 865 P.2d 893, 898 (Colo. Ct App. 1993); Konrady v. 
Oesterling, 149 F.R.D. 592, 595 {D. Minn. 1993). But see Leonard, Codifying a 
Privilege, supra note 13, at 118 n.15 {noting that others have suggested that the privilege 
possibly was first recognized in Richards v. Maine Central Railroad, 21 F.R.D. 593, 594 
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the court rejected a medical malpractice plaintiff's request for production 
of minutes and reports generated by the defendant hospital's staff 
committee meetings. The court noted that the sole objective of those 
self-analytical meetings, which were conducted with the expectation of 
confidentiality, was the .. improvement in care and treatment of hospital 
patients."5s The intent of maintaining confidentiality in the medical 
peer review context is to encourage physicians to candidly criticize and 
review one another in an atmos.phere that is closed to civil litigants 
pursuing malpractice claims against a physician,56 The court empha-
sized that confidentiality is crucial to ensure the unimpeded flow of this 
type of information, thus protecting society's interest in improved health 
care and treatment.57 Acknowledging that exposure of these confi.den~ 
tial and sensitive deliberations to discovery absent "a showing of 
exceptional necessity, would result in terminating such deliberations,"5s 
the Bredice court held that medical peer review meetings are entitled to 
a qualified self-critical analysis privilege "on the basis of the overwhelm-
ing public interest'' in imp~oving prospective medical care.59 
(D. Me. 1957), which protected from discovery in a wrongful death action defendant 
railroad's investigatory documents that were required by statute to be filed with the 
state's Public Utilities Commission because ''to require the production of such reports 
would clearly violate the public policy evidenced by the statute [mandating those 
reports]"). 
54. 50 F.R.D. 249 (D.D.C.), aff'd on reh'g, 51 F.RD. 187 (D.D.C. 1970), ajf'd, 
479 F.2d 920 (D.C. Cir. 1973). 
55. Id. at 250 (quoting Standards of Hospital Accreditation, ch. II, pt. C, ,r 4 (Jan. 
1964)). 
56. See Konrady, 149 F.R.D. at 598 (D. Minn. 1993). The Bredice court wisely 
noted: "Gandid and conscientious evaluation of clinical practices is a sine qua non of 
adequate hospital care .... Constructive professional criticism cannot occur in an 
atmosphere of apprehension that one doctor's suggestion will be used as a denunc:iation 
of a colleague's conduct in a malpractice suit." 50 F.R.D. at 250, 
57. Bredice, 50 F.R.D. at 250. 
58, Id. 
59, Id. at25l;seealso Bredice v. Doctors Hosp., Inc., 51 F.R.D. 187, 188 (O.D.C. 
1970) (rehearing, but adhering to earlier ruling). 
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Subsequently. many courts have applied,60 and most states have 
60. See, e.g., Oviatt v. Archbishop Bergan Mercy Hosp., 214 N.W.2d 490, 492 
(Neb. 1974) (holding records of medical staff committee concerning defendant 
physician's suspension privileged); Tucson Med. Ctr., Inc. v. Misevch, 545 P.2d 958, 
961-62 (Ariz. 1976) (holding reports and minutes of medical review committee not 
subject to subpoena in wrongful death action alleging hospital's negligence in retaining 
anesthesiologist); Scott v. McDonald, 70 F.R.D. 568, 572 (N.D, Ga. 1976) (applying 
Georgia statute protecting hospital medical review proceedings from discovery); Dade 
County Med. Ass'n v. Hlis, 372 So. 2d 117, 120 (Fla. App. 1979) (noting the value of 
ethics committee's confidential self-analytical reports "'would be destroyed if the 
meetings and the names of those participating were to be opened to the discovery 
process"') (quoting Bredice, 50 F.R.D. at 2S0); Mewborn v. Heckler, 101 F.R.D. 691, 
693 (D.D.C. 1984); Bundy v. Sinopoli, 580 A.2d 1101, 1106 (N.J. 1990) (holding that 
opinions, criticisms, and evaluations in peer review committee reports are _l)rotected); 
State ex rel. Faith Hosp. v. Enright, 706 S.W.2d 852, 855-56 (M"o. 1986) (holding 
hospital peer review committee documents not discoverable); Emory Clinic v. Houston, 
369 S.E.2d 913, 913 (Ga. 1988) (prohibiting discovery of peer review infonnation under 
state peer and medical review statutes); In re "K", 561 A.2d 1063, 1066-67 (N.H. 1989) 
(holding that hospital may have more than one "quality assurance committee" and 
prohibiting discovery of minutes of hospital's infectious diseases committee); Estate of 
HuS'sain v. Gardner, 624 A.2d 99, IOI (N.J. Super. 1993) (holding that opinions, 
criticisms, and evaluations contained in hospital's internal peer review committee's files 
absolutely privileged); Gates v. Deulanejian, No. Civ. S-87-1636 LKKJFM, 1988 WL 
92568, at *3 (E.D. Cal. July 27, 1988) (holding minutes of hospital staff meetings 
undiscoverable in civil rights suit alleging constitutional violations in operation of 
medical facility). But see Gillman v. United States, 53 F.R.D. 316, 318-19 (S.D.N.Y. 
1971) (holding that mental hospital's internal inquiry following patient's suicide was 
protected as to its own procedural investigation, but not as to testimony regarding the 
incident itself); Smith v. Lincoln Gen. Hosp., 605 So. 2d 1347, 1348 (I.a. 1992) 
(acknowledging qualified privilege to records of hospital's infection control committee, 
but not applying privilege to factual accountings); Konrady, 149 F.R.D. at 596 (holding 
hospital institutional review board not a peer review committee); In re Parkway Manor 
Healthcare Ctr., 448 N,W.2d 116, I 19M20 (M"inn. Ct App. 1989) (holding that nursing 
home's quality assurance committee did not constitute a review organization under 
Minnesota's peer review statute because the committee included nonprofessional 
members); State ex rel. Chandra v. Sprinkle, 678 S.W.2d 804,808 (M"o. 1984) (en bane) 
(holding no privilege exists to protect factual infonnation compiled by peer review 
committee); Robinson v. Magovem, 83 F.R.D. 79, 85-86 (YI.D. Pa. 1979) (holding 
hospital peer review communications discoverable in antitrust action based on denial of 
hospital staff privileges); Memorial Hosp. v. Shadur, 664 F.2d 1058, 1062-63 (7th Cir. 
1981) (refusing to apply privilege to peer review materials in physician's antitrust action 
against hospital); Todd v. South Jersey Hosp. Sys., 152 F.R.D. 676,682 (D.N.J. 1993) 
(holding peer review privilege may be overcome by plaintiff's compelling need for 
disclosure); Ott v. St Luke Hosp., 522 F. Supp. 706, 709 (E.D. Ky. 1981) (denying 
privilege when there was no showing denial would impair peer-reivew committees' 
functions); McClain v. College Hosp., 492 A.2d 991, 997-98 (NJ. 1985) (holding 
confidentiality of state licensing board's investigative records overcome by plaintiff's 
compelling need for disclosure); Wesley Med. Ctr. v. Clark, 669 P.2d 209, 215-17 (Kan. 
1983) (holding interest in discovery outweighs need for confidential communications); 
105 
codified,61 the common-law privilege enunciated in Bredice to protect 
medical peer review documentation. Moreover, in an effort to extend 
the privilege beyond the medical peer review setting, litigants have 
asserted it in a variety of different contexts. For example, the privilege 
has been asserted successfully in employment discrimination and 
wrongful discharge cases in an attempt to shield self-evaluative 
affirmative action plans and equal employment opportunity policies.62 
Lizotte v. New York City Health & Hosp. Corp., No. 85 Civ. 7548(wk), 1989 WL 
260217, at *3-*4 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 28, 1989) (holding no privilege exists to protect 
incident reports or factual information. contained in minutes of quality assurance 
committee meetings); Davidson v, Light. 79 F.R.D. 137, 139-40 (D. Colo. 1978) 
(holding infection control report discoverable in medical malpractice action); but cf. Wei 
v. Bodner, 127 F.R.D. 91, 98-99 (D,N.J. 1989) (holding pnvilege inapplicable to peer 
review materials in physician's action against other physicians and hospital for 
anticompetitive actions in violation of Sherman Act). See generally Christopher S. 
Morter, Note, The Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986: Will Physidans Find 
Peer Review More Inviting?, 74 VA. L, REv. II 15 (1988) (providing good overview of 
confidentiality of peer review proceedings); Gregory G. Gosfield, Comment, Medical 
Peer Review Protection in the Health Care Industry, 52 TEMP. L.Q. 552, 566 (1979) 
(discussing background and rationale of peer review functions). 
61. See, e.g., CAL. EvID. CoDE §§ ll57-ll57.7 (West 1995); D.C. CODE ANN. 
§ 32-505 (1981); GA. CoDE ANN. § 31-7-143 (1994); MINN. STAT. §§ 14S.61-145.65 
(West 1990); WIS. STAT. ANN.§ 146.38 (West 1993). Some statutes only provide civil 
immunity to peer review participants, while others erotect all or certain portions of the 
reviews from discovery. Still other statutes provide both types of protection. See 
Leonard, Codifying a Privilege, supra note 13, at 119-20 n.25; Flanagan, supra note 20, 
at 577 nn.136-44. See generally Charles David Creech, Comment, The Medical Review 
Committee Privilege: A Jurisdictio11al Survey, 67 N.C. L REv. 179 (1988). Qualified 
immunity for peer review participation is also embodied in federal legislation. See 
Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986, 42 U.S.C. §§ 11101-152. See generally 
Susan L. Homer, The Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986: lts History, 
Provisions, Applications and Implications, 16 AM. JL. & MED. 4S3 (1990), 
62. Outside of the medical peer review context, the majority of cases dealing with 
the self-critical analysis privilege deal with an employer's equal employment opportunity 
evaJuations and affirmative action plans as those documents relate to employment 
discrimination claims, See Coates v. Johnson & Johnson, 756 F.2d 524, 551 (7th Cir. 
1985) (recognizing prevailing view that self-critical portions of affirmative action plans 
are privileged, but not deciding whether privilege existed in that case because of waiver); 
Banks v. Lockheed-Georgia Co., 53 F.R.D. 283, 284-85 (N.D. Ga. 1971) (holding 
undiscoverable defendant company's evaluation of its equal employment opportunities 
because a "candid self-analysis" of its employment practices); Rosario v. New York 
Times Co., 84 F.R.D. 626,631 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (allowing newspaper to assert privilege 
to protect self-evaluative affirmative action documents); McClain v. Mack Trucks, Inc., 
85 F.R.D. 53, 58 (E.D. Pa. 1979) (applying privilege to shield employer's affirmative 
action plan from discovery); O'Connor v. Chrysler Corp., 86 F.RD. 211, 216-18 (D. 
Mass. 1980) (upholding qualified privilege to evaluative portions of employer's 
affirmative action plans in gender discrimination case); Roberts v. National Detroit 
Corp., 87 F.RD. 30, 32-33 (E.D. Mich. 1980) (allowing employer in racial discrimina-
tion case limited privilege as to portions of self-critical documents analyzing equal 
employment opportunity goals); Hoffinan v. United TeJecomms., Inc., 117 F.R.D. 440, 
443 (D, Kansas 1987) (applying privilege to analysis performed for employer in 
preparation of affirmative action program); Parker v. Kroger Co., 19 Empl. Prac. Dec. 
106 
[VOL, 34: 93, 1997] Self-Critical Analysis Privilege 
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW 
(CCH) 'ii 8995, at 6164-65 (N.D. Ga. 1977) (holding privileged employer's affinnative 
action plans and portions of reports containing such plans); Brown v, Ford Motor Co., 
19 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) ,r 8969, at 6026-28 (N.D. Ga. 1978) (noting split of authority 
and competing interests, court ordered in camera inspection of employer's affirmative 
action plans before ruling on discoverability); Dickerson v. United States Steel Corp., 
12 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 'ii 11,095, at 5070-71 (E.D. Pa. 1976) (declining to order 
employer to disclose material regarding affinnative action plan, acknowledging the 
chilling effect it would have on employer's critical self-analysis); Stevenson v. General 
Blee. Co., 18 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) ,r 8777, at 5148 (S.D. Ohio 1978) (denying 
discovery of affirmative action plans); Rodgers v. United States Steel Corp., I I Empl. 
Prac. Dec. {CCH) ,r 10,666, at 6815 (W.D. Pa. 1975) (refusing to order disclosure of 
employer's internal documents regarding personnel selection procedures); Sanday v. 
Carnegie-Mellon Univ., 11 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) ,r 10,659, at 6796 (E.D. Pa. 1975) 
(refusing discovery of employer's affinnative action flan, so as not to destroy "candid 
reflection and internal evaluation"); EEOC v. Genera Tel. Co., 885 F.2d 575, 578 (9th 
Cir. 1989) (holding evidence of employer's equal employment opportunity efforts 
inadmissible); Mazzella v. RCA Global Communications, Inc., No. 83 Civ. 3716(wcc), 
1984 WL 55541, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. March 28, 1984) (upholding qualified privilege for 
purely self-evaluative portions of defendants' affirmative action plans in gender 
discrimination case); Cobb v. Rockefeller Univ., 58 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. {BNA) 184 
(S.D.N.Y. 1991) (upholding qualified privilege to self-evaluative portions of employer's 
affirmative action plan in gender discrimination case); Flynn v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., 
1993 WL 362380 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 16, 1993) (upholding qualified privilege for reports 
summarizing employer's barriers to equal and fair employment of women in gender 
discrimination case); Jamison v. Storer Broad. Co., 511 F. Supp. 1286, 1296-97 (E.D. 
Mich. 1981) (holding internal documents regarding equal employment opportunity 
reporting requirements inadmissible in discrimination case); see also New York Stock 
Exch. v. Sloan, 22 Fed. R. Serv. 2d (callaghan) 500, 504 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) {holding 
employee evaluations prepared by corporate auditor confidential); Korostynski v. State 
Div. of Gaming Enforcement, 630 A.2d 342,348 (N.J. Super. 1993) (upholding privilege 
to internal investigation records in 'WTODgful discharge case). But see In re Burlington 
N., Inc., 679 F.2d 762, 767 (8th Cir. 1982) (refusing to apply privilege to employer's 
affinnative action plan); Webb v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 81 F.R.D. 431, 433-35 
(E.D. Pa. 1978) (holding studies demonstrating or tending to demonstrate racial 
discrimination discoverable); Reynolds Metals Co. v. Rwnsfeld, 564 F.2d 663, 667 (4th 
Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 995 (1978) (rejecting privilege because reports ''not 
prepared solely for internal use"); Emerson Elec. Co. v. Schlesinger, 609 F.2d 898,907 
(8th Cir. 1979) (rejecting privilege because reports ''not made solely for intema1 use"); 
Resnick v. American Dental Ass'n, 95 F.R.D. 372, 374-75 (N.D. Ill. 1982) (holding 
personnel practices study performed for employer by consulting firm and documents of 
employer's employee relations committee not privileged because not government-
required reports); Capellupo v. FMC Corp., 46 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1193 (D. 
Minn. May 3, 1988) (noting 8th Circuit's reluctance to accept the privilege and refusing 
to apply privilege to affirmative action documents in Title VII gender discrimination 
case); Vanek v. Nutrasweet Co., 59 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) ,r 41,600 (N.D. Ill. 1992) 
(holding privilege inapplicable to facts or data in affirmative action docwnents and 
inapplicable to voluntary reports in Title VII discrimination case); Hoffman v. United 
Telecomms., Inc., 50 Empl. Prac, Dec. (CCH) "J 38,953 (D. Kan. 1989) (holding 
privilege inapplicable to personal opinion of company's affirmative action officer); Penk 
v, Oregon State Bd., 99 F.RD. 511, 512 (D. Or. 1983) (holding privilege inapplicable 
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The privilege also bas been applied less frequently to protect internal 
police department investigations,63 bar association inquiries,64 academ-
to voluntary reports); Steinle v. Boeing Co., 62 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 272 (D. 
Kan. 1992) (refusing to apply privilege to voluntary job study reports in Title VII sex 
discrimination case); Witten v. A.H. Smith Co., 100 F.RD. 446, 452-54 (D. Md. 1984), 
afj'd, 185 F.2d 306 (4th Cir. 1986) (refusing to recognize privilege in equal employment 
opportunity case and allowing plaintiff access to affirmative action plans and EE0-1 
reports, including self-evaluative portions); Williams v. Vulcan-Hart Corp., 136 F.R.D. 
457, 460 (W.D. Ky. 1991) (recognizing unlikelihood that Kentucky courts would 
recognize privilege and compelling production of employer's affirmative action plan in 
racial discrimination case); Siskonen v. Stanadyne, Inc., 124 F.R.D. 610, 611-12 (W.D. 
Mich. 1989) (noting that Michigan does not recognize privilege and compelling 
production of affirmative action plans and EEO-I reports in wrongful discharge and sex 
discrimination suit); EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 22 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 
468 (M.D. Ala. 1980) (acknowledging J?rivilege, but requiring production of self-
evaluative reports regarding compliance Wlth statutory or regulatory guidelines because 
the reports contained raw data); State ex rel. Corbin v. Weaver, 680 P.2d 833, 838 (Ariz. 
Ct. App. I 984) (holding privilege inapplicable to documents gathered during employer's 
investigation of employment discrimination charge); Aramburu v. Boeing Co., 885 F. 
Supp. 1434, 1440-41 (D. Kan. 1995) (holding it is inappropriate to recognize privilege 
in Title VII cases); Martin v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., 54 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 'ii 
40,079 (D.D.C. 1990) (refusing to apply privilege to equal opportunity reports in private 
employment discrimination case); West v. Marion Lab., Inc., No. 90-0661-CV-W-2, 
1991 WL 517230, at *5 (W.D. Mo. Dee. 12, 1991) (noting 8th Circuit's reluctance to 
acknowledge privilege and requiring production of employer's affirmative action plan); 
Frazier v. Southeastern Penn. Transp. Auth., Civ. A. No. 84-3004, 1988 WL 117869, at 
*1-*3 (E.D. Pa. Nov. t, 1988) (refusing to awly privilege to various documents, 
including analyses, reports, and surveys relating to racia1 turnover, termination rates, and 
sexual harassment, and Office of Civil Rights reports:); Hardy v. New York News, Inc., 
114 F.R.D. 633,641 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (holding documents pertaining to development of 
affirmative action plan discoverable in employment discrimination action); Tharp v. 
Sivyer Steel Corp., 149 F.R.D. 177, 180-85 (S.D. Iowa 1993) (refusing to apply privilege 
to employer's affinnative action plans in sex discrimination case); Etienne v. Mitre 
Corp., 146 F.R.D. 145, 148-49 (E.D. Va. 1993) (holding privilege inapplicable to data 
and studies regarding employer's compliance with equal employment opportunity law 
in age discrimination case); Boyd v, City ofNew York, No. 86 Civ. 4501-CSH, 1987 
WL 6915, at *1-*2 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 11, 1987) (rejecting application of privilege to report 
prepared by Human Resources regarding employment incident at issue); United States 
v. Dexter Corp., 132 F.R.D. 8, 9-10 (D. Conn. 1990) (denying corporate defendant 
qualified privilege against disclosure of self-evaluative documents in action to enforce 
Clean Water Act). See generally Hermie, supra note 8. 
63. See Kott v. Perini, 283 F. Supp. I, 2 (N.D. Ohio 1968) (holding records of 
police department privileged and not subject subpoena in petition for writ of habeas 
corpus); Brown v. Thompson, 430 F.2d 1214, 1215 (5th Cir. 1970) (holding government 
docwnents privileged and not subject to disclosure); Frankenhauser v. Rlzzo, 59 F.RD. 
339, 342 (E.D. Pa. 1973) (discussing "chilling effect'' on police investigations and 
calling the privilege an "executive privilege": "[T]he government's privilege to prevent 
disclosure of certain infonnation whose disclosure would be contrary to the public 
interest''); Ostoin v. Waterford Township Police Dep't, 471 N.W.2d 666, 668-69 (Mich. 
App. 1991) (upholding qualified privilege to internal documents reflecting governmental 
agency's "evaluative" or "deliberative processes"); Dos Santos v, O'Neill, 62 F.RD. 
448, 449-51 (E.D. Pa. 1974) (acknowledging qualified "executive" privilege, but not 
applicable to facts); Aleman v. Bonnstetter, No. 89 C 2480, 1991 WL 32757, at *7-1118 
(N.D. Ill. March 6, 1991) (applying qualified privilege because plaintiff showed no 
108 
[VOL. 34: 93, 1997) Self-Critical Analysis Privilege 
SAN PIEGO LAW REVIEW 
ic peer reviews,65 accident investigations,56 and environmental au-
exceptional circumstances). But see Wood v. Breier, 54 F.R.D. 7, 10-13 (E.D. Wis. 
1972) (holding police chief not entitled to protective order preventing discovery of 
investigation of alleged assault by policemen); Denver Policeman's Protective Ass'n v. 
Lichtenstein, 660 F.2d 432, 435-36 (10th Cir. 1981) (ordering disclosure of police 
investigative file, holding search for truth and criminal's need for exculpatory matter 
outweighed any expectation of privacy on part of police); Elliot v. Webb, 98 F.R.D. 293, 
297 (D. Idaho 1983) (allowing discovery of internal investigation of police officers in 
civil rights action); Urseth v. City of Dayton, 653 F. Supp. 1057, 1061-62 (S.D. Ohio 
1986) (acknowledging qualified privilege, but holding exceptional circumstances 
overcame privilege); Asblll}' Park Press, Inc .. v. Borough of Seaside Heights, 586 A.2d 
870, 874-75 (N.J. Super. 1990) (holding newspaper's and public's right to know 
outweighed need of confidentiality); Soto v. City of Concord, 162 F.R.D. 603, 611-13 
(N.D. Cal. 1995) (refusing to apply privilege and ordering production of internal affairs 
records); Everitt v. Brezzel, 750 F. Supp. 1063, 1068 (D, Colo. 1990) (recognizing 
"official information" privilege, but requesting in camera review to determine 
applicability of privilege). 
64. See, e.g., In re Petition oflll. Judicial Inq_uixy Bd, 471 N.E.2d 601, 603-05 (Ill. 
App. Ct. 1984) (extending privilege to bar association's records relating to evaluation 
of judges). But see Wright v. Patrolmen's Benevolent Ass'n, 72 F.R.D. 161, 163-64 
(S.D.N.Y. 1976) (acknowledging privilege, but holding bar association's investigation 
into transfer of judge discoverable because only factual materials requested). 
65. See, e.g., Keyes v. Lenoir Rhyne College, 552 F.2d 579, 581 (4th Cir. 1977), 
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 904 (1977) (upholding trial court's refusal to require production 
of confidential faculty member evaluations in Title VII suit, but without specifically 
mentioning privilege); Gray v. Board of Higher Educ., 692 F.2d 901, 907-09 (2d Cir. 
1982) (acknowledging privilege, but holding it outweighed by constitutional concerns); 
EEOC v. University of Notre Dame, 715 F.2d 331, 340 (7th Cir. 1983) (applying 
privilege to peer review materials in racial discrimination claim by"professor), overruled 
by University of Pa. v. EEOC, 493 U.S. 182 (1990); Zaustinsky v. University of Cal., 
96 F.R.D. 622,624 (N.D. Cal. 1983), affd, 782 F.2d 1055 (9th Cir. 1985) (acknowledg-
ing confidentiality of materials in peer evaluation files in tenured faculty member's Title 
VII action based on gender discrimination); McKillop v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 386 
F. Supp. 1270, 1278 (N.D. Cal. 1975) (applying privilege to tenure files). But see 
University of Pa. v. EEOC, 493 U.S. 182 (1990) (refusing to recognize privilege in Title 
VII case to protect tenure peer review materials from disclosure where such materials 
were relevant to charges of racial or sexual discrimination); In re Dinnan, 661 F.2d 426, 
427 (5th Cir. 1987), cert. denied sub nom. Dinnan v. Blaubers, 457 U.S. 1106 (1982) 
(holding vote in tenure review not protected by privilege). 
66. See, e.g., Richards v. Maine Central R.R., 21 F.R.D. 593, 594 (D. Me. 1957) 
(holding statements taken by defendant not discoverable when witnesses were equally 
available to plaintiff); Southern Ry. v. Lanham, 403 F.2d 119, 130-31 {5th Cir. 1969) 
(allowing discovery of prior statements, but excluding mental impressions and personal 
evaluations concerning railroad accident); Grangerv. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 116 
F.R.D. 507, 510 (E.D. Pa. 1987) (holding analysis and recommendation portions of 
railroad's postaccident investigation privileged in action under Federal Employers' 
Liability Act); Wylie v. Mills, 478 A.2d 1273, 1276-77 (N.J, Super. 1984) (upholding 
qualified privilege to evaluative portions of internal postaccident report); see also 
Culimuy Foods, Inc. v. Raychem Corp., 151 F.R.D. 297, 304-05 (N.D. Ill. 1993) 
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dits.67 Furthermore, the privilege has been raised to shield investigative 
reports from discovery in securities, 68 products liability, 69 antitrust, 70 
(acknowledging privilege, but not deciding applicability in particular discovery dispute); 
Martin A. v. Gross, 605 N.Y.S.2d 742, 747-48 (N.Y. App. Div. 1993) (holding "public 
interest'' privilege protected internal city report regarding child abuse investigation). But 
see Dowling v, American Hawaii Cruises, Inc., 971 F.2d 423, 426 (9th Cir. 1992) 
(holding privilege inapplicable to safety committee minutes); Jolly v. Superior Court, 540 
P.2d 658, 662-63 (Ariz. 1975) (refusing to create a privilege for safety inspections); 
Myers v. Uniroyal Chem. Co., Civ. A. No. 916716, 1992 WL 97822, •9-*10 (E.O. Pa. 
May 5, 1992) (refusing to apply privilege to industrial accident reports containing safety 
recommendations); Combined Communications Corp. v. Public Serv. Co., 865 P.2d 893, 
898 (Colo, Ct App. 1993) (refusing to recognize privilege in Colorado); Peterson v. 
Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co., 112 F.R.D. 360, 364-65 (W.D. Mich. 1986) (refusing to 
apply privilege to evaluation and recommendation portion of postaccident report). 
61. See, e.g., Reichhold Chem,, Inc. v. City of Pensacola, 157 F.R.D. 522, 526 
(N.D. Fla. 1994) (upholding qualified privilege for retrospective analysis of prior 
conduct, practices, occurrences, and resulting environmental consequences). But see 
CPC Int'! v. Hartford Accident & lndem. Co., 620 A.2d 462, 468 (N,J. Super. 1992) 
(refusing to apply privilege to documents in connection with environmental cleanup of 
toxic waste sites because insurers' needs for discovery outweighed any claim of 
privilege); State er rel. Celebrezze v. Cecos Int'l, Inc., 583 N.E.2d 1118, 1120-21 (Ohio 
Ct App. 1990) (refusing to apply privilege to internally generated performance 
evaluations of operators of hazardous waste facilities); TW AR, Inc. v. Pacific Bell, 145 
F.R.D. 105, 107-08 (N.D. Cal. 1992) (refusing to apply privilege to confidential audit 
materia1s prepared pursuant to government mandate). See generally O'Reilly,supra note 
13. 
68. See Diversified Indus., Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596, 611 {8th Cir. 1977) {en 
bane) (holding that disclosure of information to the SEC did not constitute waiver of 
privilege: "To hold otherwise may have the effect of thwarting the developing procedure 
of corporations to employ independent outside counsel to investigate and advise them 
in order to protect stockholders, potential stockholders and customers."); In re Grand 
Jury Subpoena dated July 13, 1979, 478 F. Supp. 368, 374-75 (E.D. Wis. 1979) 
(applying privilege to internal analyses written by attorney); In re Crazy Eddie Sec. 
Litig., 792 F. Supp. 197, 205-06 (E.D.N.Y. 1992) (prohibiting discovezy of internal 
review of corporate audit and letter commenting on internal quality controls); In re LTV 
Sec. Litig., 89 F.R.D. 595, 611 (N.D. Tex. 1981} (holding that materials generated by· 
special officer retained to implement SEC consent decree were privileged); Br.mes v. 
IDS Realty Trust, 85 F.R.D. 679, 686-89 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (applying privilege to 
documents in possession of securities lawyer who had counseled defendants, even though 
the information had been previously disclosed to the SEC); In re Dayco Derivative Sec. 
Litig., 99 F.R.D. 616, 619-21 (S.D. Ohio 1983) (holding special committee report 
prepared by outside counsel privileged). Diversified and In re Grand Jury Subpoena 
actually were decided under the attorney-client privilege, but the rationale employed 
supports the self-critical analysis privilege, See also New York Stock Exch. v. Sloan, 
22 Fed. R. Serv. 2d {Callaghan) 500,505 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (a_pplying privilege in private 
action under Securities Exchange Act to employee evaluations prepared by corporate 
auditor). But see In re Penn Cent. Commercial Paper Litig., 61 F,R.D, 453, 466-67 
(S.D.N.Y. 1973) (holding documents previously submitted to SEC discoverable); In re 
Salomon Inc. Sec. Litig., Fed Sec. Litig. Rep. (CCH) 'ii 97,254 (S,D.N.Y. 1992) 
(refusing to apply privilege); First R Corp. v. Mainwaring, 21 F.3d 465,467 (D.C. Cir. 
1994) (criticizing privilege and holding that bank had waived its claim of privilege); cf. 
United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 465 U.S. 805, 817-18 (1984) (rejecting policy 
arguments similar to those supporting self-critical analysis privilege and holding papers 
of auditors used to prepare financial reports required by federal securities laws 
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and libel actions.71 In addition, commentators have advocated extend-
unprivileged). See generally John F.X. Peloso, The Privilege for Sel.fCritical Analysis: 
Protecting the Public by Protecting the Confidentiality of Internal Investigations in the 
Securities Industry, 18 SEC. REG. L.J. 229 (1990). 
69. See, e.g., Shipes v. Bic Corp., 154 F.R.D. 301, 306 (M.D. Ga. 1994) 
(upholding privilege to self-evaluative documents created by manufacturer for submission 
to Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC)); Adams v. Wecker, No. L-019761-85, 
Law Division, Essex Co. (N.J. Super. 1985); Rickerson, supra note 8, at 507 (''(A] 
federal district court prevented the disclosure of required governmental filings ... stating 
'[t]he need to encourage full and frank disclosure of information to the government 
regarding defective products is of crucial importance to the consuming public. The 
success of the reporting scheme would be severely undercut if manufacturers feared that 
their frank disclosures may be used against them in lawsuits."' (guotin~ Ashley v. 
Uniden Corp. of Am., Civil No. SA-84-CA-2383 (W.D. Tex. 1986)); id. (noting case 
wherein the internal report evaluating company's marketing of the product at issue, 
which was generated by special committee of outside directors and outside lawyers, was 
privileged: "To allow this self-evaluation to be used by litigation adversaries would 
have an undue chilling effect on a cOipomtion's ability to evaluate its performance and 
the actions of its employees where such evaluation is in the public interest." (quoting 
McCracken v. Eli Lilly & Co., Case No. 34,463 (Cir. Ct. Ind. 1984)); see also Plough 
Inc. v. National Academy of Sciences, 530 A.2d 1152, 1160 (D.C. 1987) (prohibiting 
discovery by manufacturer in products liability suit of private scientific academy 
documents); cf Lloyd v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 74 F.R.D. 518, 520-22 (E.D. Tenn. 1977) 
(disallowing discovery of actual contents, records, minutes, and memoranda of meetings 
concerning self-evaluation of manufacturer's products in negligence action). But see 
Lamitie v. Emerson Blee. Co., 535 N.Y.S.2d 650, 653-54 (App. Div. 1988) (refusing to 
adopt privilege to protect manufacturer's communications with CPSC); Konrady v. 
Oesterling, 149 F.R.D. 592, 598 (D. Minn. 1993) (refusing to apply "peer review" 
privilege to institutional review board); Roberts v. Carrier Corp., 107 F.R.D. 678, 685 
(N.D. Ind. 1985) (acknowledging privilege where report required by Jaw, but refusing 
to apply it to voluntary disclosure by manufacturer to CPSC); Scroggins v. Uniden 
Corp., 506 N.E.2d 83, 86 (Ind. Ct App. 1987) (refusing to acknowledge privilege where 
manufacturer sought to protect its communications with CPSC). 
70. See, e.g., Cohn v. Wilkes Gen. Hosp., 127 F.R.D. 117, 120-21 (W.D.N.C. 
1989) (holding hospital's medical review information privileged); Cameron v. New 
Hanover Mem'I Hosp., 293 S.E.2d 901, 915 (N.C. App. 1982) (applying privilege to 
hospital review committee minutes in state antitrust suit). But see Memorial Hosp. v. 
Shadur, 664 F.2d 1058, 1062-63 (7th Cir. 1981) (refusing to apply privilege to peer 
review materials in physician's antitrust action against hospital); Wei v. Bodner, 127 
F.R.D. 91, 98-99 (D.N.J. 1989) (holding privilege inapplicable to peer review materials 
in physician's action against other physicians and hospital for anticompetitive actions in 
violation of Sherman Act). 
71. See, e.g., Lasky v. American Broad. Co., 5 Fed R. Serv. 3d (Callaghan) 1366 
(S.D.N.Y, 1986) (acknowledging privilege, but holding inapplicable to facts). But see 
In re Application of New York Times Co., No. MS-85, 1984 WL 971, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. 
Oct 9, 1984) (criticizing privilege and holding it inapplicable to facts); Westmoreland 
v. CBS, Inc., 97 F.R.D. 703, 706 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (holding investigation report of 
defendant's television show broadcast not privileged in libel action). 
Ill 
ing the privilege to other types of corporate self-evaluations.n 
The rationale for protecting self-analytical materials from disclosure 
is the same in all these cases: the public's interest in encouraging candid 
institutional self-analysis outweighs the public's concern of ensuring 
complete disclosure of all relevant information to a litigant.n As 
poignantly summarized by one court, "[t]he common theme linking all 
these cases is that, in each, the policies in favor of confidentiali-
ty--protecting individuals' expectations of privacy and/or promoting free 
communication of candid evaluations and criticisms within an organiza-
tion--have been deemed strong enough to justify restrictions on liberal 
pretrial discovery."74 Supporters of the privilege suggest that to allow 
disclosure of self-evaluative materials would have a "chilling effect" on 
candid and thorough self-appraisals.75 As several courts have recog-
nized, "[c]onfidentiality and candor are complimentary to .one another. 
Destroy one and the other vanishes."76 
In order to balance the competing policy interests between liberal 
discovery and the need for candid self-critical analysis, courts acknowl-
edging the privilege generally require four criteria before applying it. 
The first three criteria were enunciated by the Bredice court: first, the 
information sought to be protected must result from a self-critical 
analysis performed by the party claiming the privilege; second, the free 
flow of this type of information must advance a strong public interest; 
and third, the information sought must result from the type of analysis 
that would be curtailed if discovery were allowed.77 The fourth 
72. See, e.g., Bush, supra note 8, at 614-15; Leonard, Codifying a Privilege, supra 
note 13, at 116-19; Crisman & Mathews, supra note 8, at 175-76; Murphy, supra note 
8, at 499. But see Flanagan, supra note 20, at 582. 
13. See Gish, supra note 13, at 79-80. 
74. New York Stock Exch. v. Sloan, 22 Fed. R. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 500, 504 
(S.D.N.Y. 1976). 
75. See Gish, supra note 13, at 80; Harvard Note,supra note 9, at 1091-93; Beck, 
supra note 12, at 358; see also Hardy v. New York News, Inc., 114 F.R.D. 633, 640 
(S.D.N.Y. 1987) (noting the privilege "is based upon the concern that disclosure of 
documents reflecting candid self-examination will deter or suppress socially useful 
investigations and evaluations or compliance with the law or professional standards''). 
76. Baumgarten v. Koch, 411 N.Y.S.2d 487, 489 (1978) (quoting Lambert v. 
Barsky, 398 N.Y.S.2d 84, 85 (N.Y. Sup. Ct 1977)). 
77. Bredice v. Doctors Hosp., 50 F.R.D. 249, 250-51 (D.D.C.) affd on reh'g, 51 
F.RD. 187 (D.D.C. 1970), aff'd, 479 F.2d 920 (D.C. Cir. 1973); see also Bush, supra 
note 8, at 605; Harvard Note, supra note 9, at 1086, Gish, supra note 13, at 80-82; 
Conway, supra note 8, at 634; Zick, supra note 6, at 402; Taylor, supra note 13, at 797; 
Beck, supra note 12, at 358; Dowling v. American Hawaii Cruises, 971 F.2d 423, 425-
26 (9th Cir. 1992); Shipes v. Bic Corp., 154 F.R.D. 301, 307 (M.D. Ga. 1994); In re 
Grand Jwy Proceedings, 861 F. Supp. 386,388 (D. Md. 1994); Combined Communica-
tions Corp. v. Public Service Co., 865 P.2d 893,898 (Colo. Ct App. 1993); Peterson v. 
Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co., 112 F.R.D. 360, 363 (W.D. Mich. 1986). 
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criterion is the general proviso underlying the law of privileges--the 
document sought to be protected was prepared with the expectation that 
it would be kept confidential and in fact has remained so.78 Unfortu-
nately, this balancing test as applied by the trial courts has resulted in 
widely conflicting decisions and inconsistent applications of the 
privilege. 
C. Judicial Impediments to Development of the 
Self-Critical Analysis Privilege 
Even where the basic Bredice criteria for the self-critical analysis 
privilege are satisfied, however, the existence of the privilege remains 
uncertain, and self-analytical evaluations may be deemed discover-
able.79 The judiciary has been increasingly reluctant to apply the self-
critical analysis privilege in cases beyond the medical peer review 
context. In fact, neither the United States Supreme Court nor the circuit 
courts have definitively denied the existence of the privilege or accepted 
the privilege and defined its scope.80 Those courts that have acknowl-
edged the privilege are in conflict regarding its application. The 
privilege "at the most remains largely undefined and has not generally 
been recognized."81 
1. General Judicial Reluctance to Expand Privileges 
The traditional concept of privileges is enunciated in the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure and the Federal Rules of Evidence, which have been 
78. See 8 WIGMORE, supra note 25, § 2285, at 527; see also Shipes, 154 F.R.D. 
at 307; In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 861 F. Supp. at 388; Dowling, 971 F.2d at 426; 
Combined Communications Corp., 865 P.2d at 898; Peterson, 112 F.R.D. at 363; 
Westtnoreland v. CBS, Inc., 97 F.R.D. 703, 706 (S.D.N.Y. 1982); Flanagan, supra note 
20, at 554-76; Gish, supra note 13, at 81. 
79. See Gish, supra note 13, at 82. 
80. See Dowling, 971 F.2d at426 n.l;ln re Grand Jury Proceedings, 861 F. Supp. 
at 387. 
81. Lloyd v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 74 F.R.D. 518,522 (E.D. Tenn. 1977); see also 
Etienne v. Mitre Corp., 146 F.R.D. 145, 147 (E.D. Va. 1993) (noting that the privilege 
"has remained ... 'not generally recognized"') (citation omitted); FfC v. TRW, Inc., 
628 F.2d 207,210 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Lamitie v. Emerson Blee. Co., 535 N.Y.S.2d 650, 
653 (N.Y. App. Div. 1988); Myers v. Uniroyal Chem. Co., Civ. A. No. 916716, 1992 
WL 97822, at *2 (E.D. Pa. May 5, 1992); In re Burlington N., Inc., 679 F.2d 762, 765 
n.4 (8th Cir. 1982). 
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adopted by most states.32 Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 
discovery is liberally allowed.83 for "any matter, not privileged, which 
is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action."84 
"Relevance" is construed liberally.85 Even information potentially 
inadmissible at trial is discoverable, absent a privilege, if such informa-
tion could lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.86 Thus, the 
scope of relevance in discovery is broader than the standard of ultimate 
admissibility at trial.87 
In contrast to the concept of relevance, it is well-settled that the term 
"privileged" as used in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure corresponds 
with the concept of "privilege" as developed by the Federal Rules of 
Evidence.88 Thus, in discovery, the concept of privilege "is neither 
82. States have enacted substantially similar liberal discovery rules. E.g., CAL. Crv. 
PROC. CODE§ 2017 (West 1983 & Supp. 1997). 
83. "The purpose of discovery is to allow a broad search for facts, the names of 
witnesses, or any other matters which may aid a party in the preparation or presentation 
of bis case." FED. R. Ctv. P. 26(b) advisory committee's note (1946 amendment) 
(citations omitted); see Gish, supra note 13, at 76 n.13. 
84. FED. R. Crv. P. 26(b)(I). These liberal discovery provisions reflect the primacy 
goal of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: "to secure the just, speedy, and 
inexpensive determination of every action." FED. R. CIV. P. I. 
85. See. e.g., Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 351 (1978) 
("[Relevance] has been construed broadly to encompass any matter that bears on, or that 
reasonably could lead to other matter that could bear on, any issue that is or may be in 
the case."); Coughlin v. Lee, 946 F.2d II52, 1159 (5th Cir. 1991) (noting that 
"relevance" traditionally has been interpreted very broadly and declining to uphold a 
discovery ruling that failed to adhere to the "liberal spirit'' of the discovery rules); Miller 
v. Pnncucci, 141 F.R.D. 292, 296 (C.D. Cal. 1992) (''The requirement of relevancy 
should be construed liberally and with common sense, rather than in tenns of narrow 
legalisms.") 
86. "The information sought need not be admissible at the trial iftbe information 
sought appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence." 
FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b){l). 
87. See 4 MOORE, supra note 26, ~ 26.07[1], at 26-120 through 26-121; WRIGHT 
ET AL, supra note 26, § 2008, at 99-100. For the purpose of admissibility at trial, 
evidence is "relevant" if it bas "any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is 
of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than 
it would be without the evidence." FED. R. EVID. 401. 
88. Rule 1101 {c) of the Federal Rules of Evidence provides that "[t]be rule with 
respect to privileges applies at all stages of all actions, cases, and proceedings." FED. 
R. EVID. 1 I0l(c); see also United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. I, 6-7 (1953) ("We 
think it should be clear that the tenn 'not privileged' ... refers to 'privileges' as that 
term is understood in the law of evidence."); Memorial Hosp. v. Shadur, 664 F.2d 1058, 
l061 (7th Cir. 1981) ("Rule SOI of the Federal Rules of Evidence provides the 
framework for determining whether material sought in discovery is privileged.''); Roberts 
v. Carrier Corp., 107 F.R.D. 678,685 {N.D. Ind. 1985); Peterson v. Chesapeake & Ohio 
Ry. Co., 112 F.R.D. 360,363 (W.D. Mich. 1986) (holding evaluation and recommenda-
tion portions of derailment report unprivileged); infra note 90 and accompanying text. 
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broader nor narrower than that which would be applied at trial.',s9 
Under Rule 501 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, privileges are 
governed by common-law principles as interpreted by the federal courts, 
but where state-law claims or defenses are involved, privileges are 
determined by state law.90 Unlike relevance, privileges are construed 
narrowly.91 Although the spirit behind Rule 50192 encourages courts 
89. 4 MOORE, supra note 26, 11 26.11[1], at 26-172. See, e.g., Peterson, 112 
F.R.D. at 362; Diversified Indus., Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596, 596 (8th Cir. 1977); 
In re Grand Jury Investigation, 575 F. Supp. 777, 777 (N.D. Ga. 1983); In re LTV Sec. 
Litig., 89 F.R.D. 595, 600-06 (N.D. Tex, 1981) (allowing corporation to assert attorney-
client privilege and work-product doctrine to preclude discovery of attorney-generated 
materials for the SEC). 
90. [T]he privilege of a witness [or] person ... shall be governed by the 
principles of the common law as they may be interpreted by the courts of the 
United States in the light of reason and experience. However, in civil actions 
and proceedings, with respect to an element of a claim or defense as to which 
State law supplies the rule of decision, the privilege ... shall be determined 
in accordance with State law. 
FED. R. Evm. 501. Typically, only federal privileges law will apply to a federal claim. 
But in diversity actions where state law civil claims or defenses are involved, the state 
Jaw of privileges will apply. Id.; see, e.g., Samuelson v. Susen, 576 F.2d 546,549 (3d 
Cir. 1978) ("Rule 501 requires a district court exercising diversity jurisdiction to apply 
the law of privilege which would be applied by the courts of the state in which ft sits."); 
see also WRIGHT ET AL, supra note 26, § 2016, at 223-24. See generally Martin I. 
Kaminsky, State Evidentiary Privileges in Federal Litigation, 43 FORDHAM L. REV. 923 
(197S); Olin Guy Wellborn m, The Federal Rules of Evidence and the Application of 
State Law in Federal Courts, 55 TEX. L. REV. 371 (1977). 
When both state and federal claims are present in one case and a privilege exists only 
under one set oflaws, the privilege will be unavailable. See, e.g., Perrignon v. Bergen 
Brunswig Corp., 77 F.RD. 455, 458 (N.D. Cal. 1978) ("If a communication were 
privileged under state law but not under federal Jaw [or vice versa], it would be 
meaningless to bold the communication privileged for one set of claims but not for the 
other. Once confidentiality is broken, the basic purpose ofthe privilege is defeated.'') 
91. 4 MOORE, supra note 26, 'if 26.11[1], at 26-173. 
92. See S. Rep. No. 93-1277, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1974), reprinted in 1914 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 7051, 7059, which indicates that Congress opted for the common-law 
approach in enacting Rule 501: "It should be clearly understood that, in approving this 
general rule as to privileges ... our action should be understood as reflecting the view 
that the recognition of a privilege ... should be detennined on a case•by-case basis." 
See also Upjobn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383,396 (1981) (referring to ''the spirit 
of Federal Rule of Evidence 501" and rejecting a request to develop standard in 
determining whether a privilege exists); University of Pa. v. EEOC, 493 U.S. 182, 189 
(1990) (acknowledging that Rule 501 reflects Congress's intent to grant courts 
"flexibility to develop rules of privilege on a case-by-case basis"), In fact, Congress 
rejected proposed Rules 502-513 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, which specifically 
enumerated thirteen privileges, including a privilege for reports required by governmental 
entities. See FED. R. Evm. 501 advisory committee's note regarding H.R. 93-650; see 
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to remain flexible in developing the law of privileges on a case-by-case 
basis,93 privileges are generally disfavored94 and extended cautiously 
because they frustrate the truth-finding process by impeding the 
discovery of relevant information.95 
While neither the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure nor the Federal 
Rules of Evidence define ''privilege,"96 Professor Wigmore espouses 
four requirements before courts can recognize a privilege: first, the 
communications must have occurred with the expectation of confidential-
ity; second, confidentiality of such communications must be necessary 
for the full maintenance of the relationship between the parties; third, the 
relationship must be one that public policy encourages; and fourth, the 
injury that the relationship would suffer by disclosure must outweigh the 
benefit of disclosure.97 Thus, Wigm.ore's approach attempts to balance 
the societal interests in confidentiality against the societal costs.98 
Wigmore's approach has been widely accepted by the courts, which 
generally recognize the existence of a privilege only when the public's 
need for confidentiality outweighs the public policy favoring full 
disclosure of all relevant information.99 
also supra note 26; 2 JACK B. WEINSTEIN ET AL., WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE 'IJ 502[0SJ, at 
502-13 (1996). 
93. See Gish, supra note 13, at 77 n.18; 2 WEINSTEIN, supra note 92, 'IJ 501[03], 
at 501-30 to 501-50. 
94. See, e.g., Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 175 (1979), As one scholar noted, 
"[IJbe development of judge-made privileges baited a century ago." Charles T. 
McCormick, The Scope of Privilege in the Law of Evidence, 16 TEX. L. REV. 447, 469 
(1938). 
95. See United States v. Nixon., 418 U.S. 683, 710, 713 (1974) (warning that 
privileges are not to be "lightly created nor expansively construed, for they are in 
derogation of the search for truth" and holding that the grounds for asserting privilege 
are based on a ~neral interes~versus an individual interes~in maintaining 
confidentiality); Umted States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 331 (1950) (recognizing the 
"fundamental maxim that the public ... bas a right to every man's evidence") (quoting 
8 WIGMORE, supra note 25, § 2192); McCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 34, § 72, 
al 171 (notin¥ that the effect of privileges "is clearly inhibitive; rather than facilitating 
the illumination of truth, they shut out the light''); Leonard, An Emerging Privilege, 
supra note 15, at 3; Gish. supra note 13, at 76. 
96. See Flanagan, supra note 20, at 573-74. 
97. See 8 WIGMORE, supra note 25, § 2285, at 531. 
98. See Bush, supra note 8, at 640. But see id. at 636 n.255, 641 n.287 (asserting 
that the social utility derived from ·application of the privilege outweighs its correspon-
dent costs). 
99. See 4 MOORE, supra note 26, 'IJ 26.11[3], at 26-192; Trammel v. United States, 
445 U.S. 40, 50 (1980) (recognizing that privileges may be justified when there is "a 
public good transcending the nonnally predominant principle of utilizing all rational 
means of ascertaining truth"); Upjohn v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981); 
Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 509-12 (1947); see also Gish, supra note 13, at 75 
n.8, 77; Harvard Note, supra note 9, at 1084. 
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2. Judicial Limitations to the Self-Critical Analysis Privilege 
Assertions of privilege typically originate during the discovery stage 
of a dispute; consequently, the law of privileges has been uniquely 
molded by the trial courts.100 But because the self-critical analysis 
privilege is still in the early stages of development, it has not been 
accorded the wide judicial acceptance given to the more traditional 
privileges. 101 Expressing skepticism of this common-law privilege, 
courts have modified the original four-part test espoused in Bredice and 
its progeny by enumerating additional criteria that must be met before 
they will apply the self-critical analysis privilege, thus narrowing its 
application. 
Typically, modern courts concede the possible existence of the 
privilege under limited circumstances, but they ultimately hold that the 
documents at issue do not fall within the scope of the privilege.l02 For 
example, numerous courts have required that the materials sought to be 
protected must have been prepared for mandatory government re-
ports.103 Information voluntarily disclosed does not fall within the 
100. See Taylor, supra note 13, at 796; Flanagan, supra note 20, at 573; Leonard, 
Codifying a Privilege, supra note l3, at 149; Leonard, An Emerging Privilege, supra 
note 15, at 3; Harvard Note, supra note 9, at 1085 n.12. A trial court's rejection of the 
privilege during discovery will not determine the ultimate admissibility of that 
information during trial. In contrast to the liberal discovery standards, the standards for 
admissibility are more stringent See Leonard, CodVJing a Privilege, supra note 13, at 
149. Even if discovery of self-analytical documents 1s allowed, various rules of evidence 
may prevent the admission of such infonnation at trial. See, e.g., FED. R. EvID. 407 
(precluding evidence of subsequent remedial measures to prove negligence or other 
culpable conduct); see infra note 267 and accompanying text. But see Flanagan, supra 
note 20, at 558 (noting that such information could be admissible as an admission 
against interest or as a report of regularly conducted business activity). See generally 
Leonard, Codifying a Privilege, supra note 13, at 149-51. But an evidentiaty privilege 
that prevents the admission of certain information at trial also applies to prevent 
discovery of that information. See FED. R. Evm. l lOl(c),(d); Flanagan, supra note 20, 
at 553 n.12. 
101. See Flanagan, supra note 20, at 573. 
102. See, e.g., In re Burlington N., Inc., 679 F.2d 762, 765 n.4 (8th Cir. 1982). 
103. See, e.g., Shipes v. Bic Corp., 154 F.R.D. 301,307 (M.D. Ga. 1994); Culinary 
Foods, Inc. v. Raychem Corp., 151 F.R.D. 297,304 (N.D. Ill. 1993); Roberts v. Carrier 
Corp., 107 F.R.D. 678, 684 (N.D. Ind. 1985); Resnick v. American Dental Ass'n, 95 
F.R.D. 372, 374 (N.D. Ill. 1982) (refusing to apply privilege to personnel practices study 
because it was not required by government); Webb v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 81 
F.R.D. 431, 434-35 (E.D. Pa. 1978) (holding no privilege for employer documents that 
were not mandatory government reports); see also Bush, supra note 8, at 609, 6IO; 
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privilege.104 Moreover, most courts have agreed that the privilege 
extends only to subjective or evaluative materials; factual or objective 
data contained in the same reports are not privileged. 105 
Courts also uniformly have held the privilege inapplicable where the 
documents at issue are souft by a governmental agency106 or pursuant 
to a grand jury subpoena.10 The courts' refusal to apply the privilege 
against the government is logical in that the strong public interest in 
"having administrative investigations proceed expeditiously and without 
impediment''108 outweighs the public's need for confidentiality of 
internal documents. 
Further, the courts have imposed some of the limitations of the 
attorney-based protections on the self-critical analysis privilege, as 
weU.109 As applied by the courts, the self-critical analysis privilege 
resembles the work-product doctrine more than the attorney-client 
Conway, supra note 8, at 637-38. 
104. See, e.g., Roberts, 107 F.R.D. at 684; Combined Communications Corp. v. 
Public Serv. Co., 865 P.2d 893, 898 (Colo. Ct App. 1993); see also Bush, supra note 
8, at 609, 611-12; Dowling v. American Hawaii Cruises, Inc., 971 F.2d 423, 427 (9th 
Cir. 1992). 
105. See, e.g., Shipes, 154 F.R.D. at 307-08; Culinary Foods, 151 F.R.D. at 304; 
Roberts v. National Detroit Corp., 87 F.R.D. 30, 32 (E.D. Mich, 1980); Roberts, 107 
F.R.D. at 684-85; Resnick, 95 F.R.D. at 374; Gillman v. United States, 53 F.R.D, 316, 
319 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); see also Bush, supra note 8, 609-10; Conway, supra note 8, at 
63940; Zick, supra note 6, at 403-04. But see Harvard Note, supra note 9, at 1093-96 
(arguing in favor of qualified privilege for factual infonnation contained in self-
evaluative document). 
106. See, e.g., FTC v. TRW, Inc., 628 F.2d 207, 210-11 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (refusing 
to apply privilege to reports compiled by credit reporting agency in course of National 
Consumer Relations Audit); United States v. Dexter Corp., 132 F.R.D. 8, 9 (D. Conn. 
1990) (refusing to apply qualified privilege to corporate defendant's self-evaluative 
documents); Emerson Elec. Co. v. Rumsfeld, 609 F.2d 898, 907 (8th Cir. 1979); United 
States v. Noall, 587 F.2d 123, 125-26 (2d Cir. 1978) (holding privilege inapplicable in 
proceeding to enforce an IRS production order where Congress has established a policy 
requiring disclosure); Reynolds Metal Co. v. Rumsfeld, 564 F.2d 663, 667 (4th Cir. 
1976) (holding affinnative action reports unprivileged where defendant was aware that 
infonnation would be used for administration of Civil Rights Act); see also Bush, supra 
note 8, at 609-10; Conway, supra note 8, at 652-54; Gish, supra note 13, at 84-85. 
I 07. See. e.g., In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 861 F. Supp. 386, 391 (D. Md. 1994) 
(refusing to apply privilege to internal audits by company subject to jurisdiction of FDA 
and being investigated by grand jury for possible violations of FDCA). 
108. Id. at388;FTCv. TRW, Inc., 628 F.2d at2IO; see also FMC v. Port of Seattle, 
521 F.2d 431, 433 (9th Cir. 1975) ("[The] very backbone of an administtative agency's 
effectiveness in canying out the congressionally mandated duties of industry regulation 
is [its] exercise of the power to investigate ••. .''). 
109. Commentators have suggested that when possible, given the uncertainty of the 
nascent self-critical analysis privilege, corporations should structure compliance efforts 
so they qualify under one of the traditional attorney-based protections. See Murphy & 
Oyer, supra note 8, at \2. See generally Nancy C. Cody, The Attorney-Client Privilege 
and the Work Product Immunity Doctrine for the Corporote Client, 15 U. BALT. L. REV. 
251 (1986). 
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privilege.110 Similar to the work-product doctrine, the application of 
the self-critical analysis privilege is qualified and may be overcome 
where the party seeking disclosure can demonstrate a compelling need 
for the information. 111 Also analogous to the work-product doctrine, 
courts have applied the self-critical analysis privilege only in the 
discovery context. 112 Moreover, like the attorney-based protections, to 
the extent a privilege for self-critical analysis exists, it can be waived 
easily. 113 
Over the past few years, the evolution of the self-critical analysis 
privilege has been retarded even more by the 1990 Supreme Court 
decision in University of Pennsylvania v. EEOC.U4 In a unanimous 
opinion, the Court admonished that before it would recognize a 
privilege, the privilege must promote "sufficiently important interests to 
outweigh the need for probative evidence."115 Acknowledging the 
spirit of Rule 501 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, the Court cautioned 
against exercising such authority "expansively," stating, "[w]e are 
especially reluctant to recognize a privilege in an area where it appears 
that Congress has considered the relevant competing concerns but has 
not provided the privilege itself."116 The Court, reiterating the 
I to. See Leonard, An Emerging Privilege, supra note 15, at 3; see also supra notes 
43~52 and accompanying text 
111. See, e.g., Leonard, An Emerging Privilege, supra note 15, at 3; Zick, supra 
note 6, at404; In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 861 F. Supp. at388; Culin~ Foods, Inc. 
v. Raychem Corp., 151 F.R.D. 297,304 (N.D. Ill. 1993); Roberts v. Carner Corp., 107 
F.R,D. 678, 684 (N.D. Ind. 1985); Resnick v. American Dental Ass'n, 95 F.R.D. 372, 
374 (N.D. Ill. 1982); Wei v. Bodner, 127 F.R.D, 91, 100-01 (D.N.J. 1989) (rejecting 
privilege in light of plaintiff's need for infonnation); Hardy v. New York News, Inc., 
114 F.R.D. 633, 641 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (rejecting privilege because plaintiff's interest in 
gathering information outweighs any interest in maintaining its confidentiality). But see 
Harvard Note, supra note 9, at 1098-1100 (arguing that court should not consider 
plaintiff's "exceptional need" to give privilege its desired effect). 
112. See Leonard, An Emerging Privilege, supra note 15, at 3; see also supra notes 
60, 62-71, 100 and accompanying text 
113. The traditional view is that any disclosure results in waiver. See WRIGHT ET 
AL., supra note 26, § 2016.2, at 241. Because the existence of a privilege typically 
depends on confidentiality, "broaching this confidentiality as to one person destroys it 
as to the world ... unless the disclosure was itself privileged." Id. § 2016.2, at 248-49; 
see also Leonard, Codifying a Privilege, supra note 13, at 141-47; Leonard, An 
Emerging Privilege, supra note 15, at 4; Conway, supra note 8, at 656-57; supra notes 
37, 52 and accompanying text 
114. 493 U.S. 182 (1990). 
115. Id. at 189. 
116. Id. 
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judiciary's traditional view that the policy favoring open discovery 
requires privileges to be "strictly construed,"117 thus refused to extend 
the self-critical analysis privilege to faculty comments or decisions made 
during a faculty peer review procedure. 
The courts' inconsistent applications of the self-critical analysis 
privilege and the Supreme Court's failure to recognize the privilege have 
caused its validity to be questioned. As acknowledged by the Supreme 
Court, "[ a ]n uncertain privilege, or one which purports to be certain but 
results in widely varying applications by the courts, is little better than 
no privilege at all."118 
Proponents of the self-critical analysis privilege suggest that its 
questionable applicability has led corporations to fear that their self-
analytical reviews will be used against them in future litigation, thus 
thwarting or "chilling" the candor with which such evaluations are 
performed. The wide-spread judicial reluctance to extend the self-critical 
analysis privilege and the resultant unpredictability of the privilege's 
application to internal analytical reviews have prompted commentators 
and various committees of the American Bar Association to advance 
several proposals for codifying a broad self-critical analysis privilege 
beyond the medical peer review context.119 
But as discussed below, such statutes, which attempt to prevent 
discovery of self-analytical reports, cannot be applied to product-safety 
analyses performed by drug and medical device manufacturers because 
the statutes fly in the face of the FOIA and FDCA public disclosure 
requirements. 
ill. OVERVIEW OF DRUG AND 11.1EDICAL DEVICE REPORTING 
R.EQUUIBMENTS UNDER TIIB FEDERAL FOOD, 
DRUG, AND COSMETIC ACT 
The FDA, whose primary objective is protecting the public's 
health, 110 began actively regulating the manufacturing and marketing 
of drugs and medical devices in 1938 with the enactment of the 
FDCA.121 In response to the public's health and safety concerns 
117. Id. 
118. Upjobn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 393 (1981). 
119. Leonard, Codifying a Privilege, supra note 13, at 119-20, 123-48; Murphy, 
supra note 8, at 497-502. 
120. See, e.g., Pbannaceutical Mfrs. Ass'n v. FDA. 484 F. Supp. 1179, 1183 (D. 
Del. 1980) (citing United States v. An Article of Drug, Bacto-Unidisk, 394 U.S. 784, 
798 (1969)). 
121. Prior to enactment of the FDCA, Congress's firtt attempt to regulate the drug 
industry occurred in 1906 when it enacted the Federal Pure Food and Drugs Act of 1906, 
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caused by expanded modem medical technology, Congress steadily has 
increased the FDA's control over the drug and medical device industry 
by enacting a series of comprehensive amendments to the FDCA. 122 
Under the extensive regulatory scheme set forth in the FDCA and its 
accompanying regulations, drug and medical device manufacturers have 
a continuing obligation to Erovide the FDA with numerous product-
safety analyses or reviews1 that include thorough and current infor-
mation regarding the safety and effectiveness of their products. 
For example, manufacturers must include complete product safety and 
effectiveness data in all applications for investigational devices124 and 
which banned adulterated and misbranded drugs from interstate commerce. Pure Food 
and Drugs Act, ch. 3915, 34 Stat. 768 (1906). In 1938, the FDCA added the 
requirement that drug manufacturers demonstrate a drug's safety prior to marketing. 
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, ch. 675, 52 Stat. 1040 (1938) (codified as 
amended as 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-95 {1994)). 
122. These include: The Drug Amendments of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-781, § I, 1962 
U.S.C.C.A.N. (76 Stat.) 909 (codified at 21 U.S.C. §§ 358-60, amending 21 U.S.C. 
§§ 321, 331-32, 348, 351-53, 355,357, 372, 374, 376, 381) (under these amendments, 
drug manufacturers had the added requirement of demonstrating a drug's effectiveness 
prior to marketing); the Medical Device Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-295, 
§ l(a), 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. (90 Stat.) I070 (codified at 21 U.S.C. §§ 360c-360k, 379, 
379a, amending 21 U.S.C. §§ 321, 331, 334, 351-52, 358,360,374,376, 381); the 
Prescription Drug Marketing Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-293, § l(a), 1988 
U.S.C.C.A.N. (102 Stat.) 95 (amending 21 U.S.C. §§ 331, 333, 353, 381, 42 U.S.C. 
§ 3512, 15 U.S.C. § 55); the Safe Medical Devices Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-629, 
§ l(a), 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. (104 Stat.) 4511 (adding 21 U.S.C. §§ 360/, 383, amending 
21 U.S.C. §§ 321, 333, 351, 353, 360c-360j, 42 U.S.C. §§ 263d, 263f-263k, 263n, 
repealing 42 U.S.C. § 263b, redesignating 42 U.S.C. §§ 263b-263n as 21 U.S.C. 
§§ 360gg-360ss); the Medical Device Amendments of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-300, § l(a), 
1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. (106 Stat.)238 (amending21 U.S.C. §§ 321,331,334, 346a, 352-53, 
356-57, 360c-360d, 360g-360i, 360i note, 360/, 371-372a, 376, 381, 42 U.S.C. § 262); 
and the Prescription Drug Amendments of 1992 Pub. L. No. l02-353, § l(a), 1992 
U.S.C.C.A.N. (106 Stat) 941 (amending 21 U.S.C. §§ 333,353, 381). 
123. "Product safety analysis or review'' is perhaps best defined as "any 
investigation, inquiry, review, evaluation or other means by which a person or entity 
seeks to detennine, calculate, predict, estimate, evaluate or report the safety or health 
effects of the use of any of its products, systems, services or processes." ARIZ. REV. 
STAT.§ 12-681 (1996). 
124. A device manufacturer that sponsors a clinical investigation of one of its 
medical devices must comply with the Investigational Device Exemption (IDE) 
regulations. See 21 C.F.R. §§ 812.1-812.150 (1996); see also 21 C.F.R. pt 813 (1996). 
The sponsoring manufacturer must submit a report of all "unanticipated adverse device 
effects" to the FDA within ten working days after receiving notice of those effects. 21 
C.F.R. 812.150(b). An "[u]nanticipated adverse device effect'' is defined as "any serious 
adverse effect on health or safety or any life-threatening problem or death caused by, or 
associated with, a device., if that effect, problem, or death was not previously identified 
12[ 
in the underlying premarket submissions for each medical device.125 
Additionally, the FDA requires medical device manufacturers to submit 
various reports for each marketed device. Medical Device Reports 
(MDRs) constitute the majority of these postmarketing reports. 126 
Under the MDR regulations, device manufacturers must inform the FDA 
of all deaths or serious injuries127 potentially related to a medical 
device and of those device malfimctions128 when serious injury or 
death could result if the malfunction were to recur. 129 Moreover, 
under the FDA's Good Manufacturing Practice regulations (GMPs), 
device manufacturers must maintain accurate manufacturing, packaging, 
... in the investigational plan •.. , or any other unanticipated serious problem 
associated with a device .... " 21 C.F.R. § 812.3(s). 
125. Prior to marketing a device, a device manufacturer must submit either 1) n 
premarket notification submission (also lmown as a "5IO(k)" after section SIO(k) of the 
FDCA, 21 U.S.C. § 360(k)),see 21 C.F.R. §§ 807.81-807.100 (1996), or2) a Premarket 
Approval Application (PMA), see 21 C.F.R. §§ 814.1-814.84 (1996), depending on the 
classification of the device, see 21 U.S.C. § 360c (1996). Under either type of 
submission, complete product safety and effectiveness data must be included. See 21 
C.F.R. §§ 807.87, 807.92, 814.20 (1996). 
126. In addition to the MDRs that a device manufacturer must file, the FDA 
regulations require the manufacturer to file, for each newly marketed device, annual 
baseline reports, see 21 C.F.R. § 803.55 (1996), and an annual certification that it bas 
filed all necessary MDRs during the pr-evious year, see 21 C.F.R. § 803.57 (1996), 
127. A "serious injury" is defined in 21 C.F.R. § 803.3(aa)(l) as "an injury or 
illness" that: 
(i) Is life threatening; 
(ii) Results in pennanent impainnent of a body function or pennanent 
damage to a body structure; or 
(iii) Necessitates medical or surgical intervention to preclude pennanent 
impainnent of a body function or pennanent damage to a body structure. 
21 C.F.R. § 803.3(aa)(l) (1996). 
128. A "malfunction" is defined as "the failure of a device to meet any of its 
perfonnance specifications or otherwise perform as intended." 21 C.F.R. § 803.3(m). 
129. Under the MDR regulations, a medical device manufacturer must submit an 
MDR to the FDA within thirty days after the manufacturer receives or otherwise 
becomes aware ofinfonnation (e.g., in medical or scientific literature) that reasonably 
suggests that one of its marketed devices: "(l) May have caused or contributed to a 
death or serious injury; or 'I) (2) Has malfunctioned and ... would be likely to cause or 
contribute to a death or serious injury, if the malfunction were to recur." 21 C.F.R. 
§ 803.SO(a) (1996); see also 21 C.F.R. §§ 803.20(b)(3)(i)-(ii) (1996). Device 
malfunction MDRs must be filed even when no injuries have resulted. See 21 C.F.R. 
§ 803.3(q){2)(ii). But when the manufacturer becomes aware that a reyortable event 
requires remedial measures ''to prevent an unreasonable risk of substantial bann to the 
public health," 21 C.F.R. § 803.53 (1996), it must submit a five-day report to the FDA 
instead of the typical thirty-day report, 21 C.F.R. §§ 803.20(b)(3)(iii) (1996). Device 
manufacturers also have the obligation to supplement any MDRs with additional 
infonnation they may receive regarding a reportable event See 21 C.F.R. § 803.56 
(1996). See generally 21 U.S.C. § 360i (1996). 
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quality assurance, and distribution records130 to assure the FDA that all 
devices are safe and effective.131 
Similarly, drug manufacturers are required to file numerous reports 
regarding the safety and effectiveness of their investigational132 and 
marketed drug products. As with devices, companies must include 
complete product safety and effectiveness information in all underlying 
drug submissions.133 Adverse Reaction Reports (ARRs)134 are the 
most common postmarketing reports135 that drug manufacturers 
130. See21 C.F.R. §§ 820.1-820.198 (1996); 21 U.S.C. §§ 351,352, 360i, 360j(t), 
374 (1996). 
131. See 21 C.F.R. § 820.1. 
132. Under the regulations governing investigational new drug applications (INDs), 
a drug manufacturer that sponsors a clinical investigation for a drug must submit an IND 
Safety Report within ten working days after the initial receipt of infonnation of any 
adverse experience associated with the use of an IND drug that is both "serious" and 
"unexpected," 21 C.F.R § 312.32(c)(l) (1996). A "serious" adverse experience is 
defined as "any experience that suggests a significant hazard, contraindication, side 
effect, or precaution ...• [This] includes any experience that is fatal or life-threatening, 
is pennanently disabling, requires inpatient hospitalization, or is a congenital anomaly, 
cancer, or overdose," 21 C.F.R. § 312.32(a). An "unexpected" adverse experience is 
defined as one "that is not identified in nature, severity, or frequency in the current 
investigator brochure; or ... in the risk infonnation described in the general investiga-
tional plan or elsewhere in the current application." Id. If the experience was fatal or 
life-threatening, however, the manufacturer must make a telephone report to the FDA 
within three working days. See 21 C.F.R. § 312.32(c}(2). Drug manufacturers also must 
submit annual reports for each IND containing a brief report of the progress of the 
investigation, including a summary of all IND Safety Reports submitted during the prior 
year. See 21 C.F.R. § 312.33 (1996). 
133. Drug manufacturers must submit either a New Drug Application (NDA) and 
or an Abbreviated New Drug Application (ANDA) containing complete safety and 
effectiveness data for each drug. See 21 C.F.R. §§ 314.50, 314.94 (1996); 21 U.S.C. 
§ 355 (1996). 
134. Previously, these reports were known as Adverse Drug Reports (ADRs) and 
currently may be called Adverse Experience Reports (AEs) under the FDA's proposed 
rule. See 59 Fed. Reg. 54,046 (1994). 
135. The FDA requires drug manufucturers to submit other postmarketing reports, 
including an ''NDA-Field Alert Report," which must be submitted within three working 
days of a manufacturer's receipt of information concerning any incident that causes the 
drug or its labeling to be mistaken for or applied to another product or infonnation 
concerning a drug's contamination, alteration, deterioration, or failure to meet 
specifications. See 21 C.F.R. § 314.Sl(b)(l) (1996). Drug manufacturers also must 
submit annual reports for each approved drug application. Among other voluminous 
infonnation, the annual report for each drug must mclude a summary of significant new 
infonnation that could affect the safety, effectiveness, or labeling of the drug, and 
summaries of clinical data on safety and effectiveness. See 21 C.F.R. § 314.81(b)(2). 
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file.136 Under the ARR reporting regulations, 137 drug manufacturers 
must report "any adverse event associated with the use of' their drugs 
in humans, even when the event is not deemed "drug-related" or "seri-
ous"138 and the event is "expected."139 Additionally, like device 
manufacturers, drug manufacturers must comply with the FDA's drug 
GMPs to assure the FDA that all drugs are safe and effective.140 
These myriad reports enable the FDA to better protect the public 
health and safety by ensuring that drugs and medical devices are not 
"adulterated"141 or "misbranded"142 and are "safe and effective for 
their intended use."143 To assist the FDA in its protective function, the 
136. Drug manufacturers are required to submit ARRs under the NOA and ANDA 
regulations. See 21 C.F.R. §§ 314.80, 314.98 (1996). 
137. ARRs consist of several types. The "Fifteen-Day 'Alert Report,"' must be 
submitted by a drug manufacturer in four instances. First, such a report must be filed 
within fifteen working days of the manufacturer's initial receipt of infonnation for an 
adverse drug experience that is both "serious" and "unexpected." 21 C.F,R, 
§ 314.SO(c)(l)(i). Additionally, a Fifteen-Day Alert Report Followup must be submitted 
within fifteen working days of receipt of any additional infonnation. Id. Second, a 
manufacturer also must file a Fifteen-Day Alert Report ifit discovers during a periodic 
review that the frequency of serious, expected adverse drug experience reports or of 
therapeutic failures has significantly increased. 21 C,F.R. § 314,80(c)(l)(ii), Drug 
packers and distributors have identical mandatory reporting requirements in these fist two 
scenarios. 21 C.F.R. § 314.SO(c)(l)(iii). Third, a Fifteen-Day Alert Report is required 
if a drug manufacturer discovers in the scientific and medical literature reports of 
serious, unexpected adverse drug experiences or reports of a significant increase in the 
frequency of serious, expected adverse drug experiences or of therapeutic failures. 21 
C.F.R. § 314.SO(d). Fourth, a Fifteen-Day Alerl Report is required duringposlfmuketing 
studies if a serious, unexpected adverse drug experience occurs and a reasonable 
possibility exists that the drug caused the experience. 21 C.F.R. § 314.80(e), Drug 
manufacturers also must file "Periodic Adverse Drug Experience Reports" quarterly for 
three years from the date of each drug application approval, and annuaJly thereafter for 
all adverse drug experiences that are .not both serious and unexpected. 21 C.F.R. 
§ 314.80(c)(2). See generally 21 U.S.C. § 355(k). 
138. Similar to the definition of"serious" for an IND Safety Report, "serious" for 
the purposes of an adverse reaction report under an NDA or ANDA is defined as "an 
adverse drug experience that is fatal or life-threatening, is permanently disabling, 
requires inpatient hospitalization, or is a congenital anomaly, cancer, or overdose." 21 
C.F.R. § 314.SO(a). 
139. For purposes of an ARR, "unexpected" is defined as "an adverse drug 
experience that is not listed in the current labeling for the drug and includes an event 
that may be symptomatically and patbophysiologically related to an event listed in the 
labeling, but differs from the event because of greater severity or specificity." Id. 
140. See 21 C.F.R. §§ 210.1-210.3, 211.1-211.208 (1996); 21 U.S.C. §§ 351, 352, 
355, 374 (1994). 
141. A drug or device is "adu1terated" when it fails to comply with the FDA's 
standards for current good manufacturing practices. See 21 U.S.C. § 351. 
142. A drug or device is "misbranded" when its labeling fails to comply with the 
FDA's labeling requirements. See 21 U.S.C. § 352. 
143. 21 C.F.R. §§ 314.2, 803.l(a), 814.2 (1996). Device distributors aJso have 
similar mandatory reporting requirements. See 21 C.F.R. §§ 804.1-804.35 (1996); 21 
U.S.C. § 360i(a) (1994). Under the Safe Medical Devices Act of 1990, Pub. L. No, 101-
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reporting requirements require drug and medical device manufacturers 
to include highly sensitive and self-evaluative information in their 
product-related reports. 
For example, the regulations governing investigational devices require 
a manufacturer sponsoring a clinical study on a device to submit an 
investigational plan to the FDA, including a "risk analysis" for the 
investigational device,144 and to submit evaluations of any unanticipat-
ed adverse effects that result from use of the device.145 Similarly, the 
MOR reporting statute requires the device manufacturer to include not 
only factual information in its reports, 146 but also self-analytical 
information, such as a summary of how the device was involved in the 
event, any environmental conditions that tnay have influenced the event, 
relevant laboratory data, and a summary of the event evaluation 
performed by the manufacturer.147 If the FDA determines that addi-
tional information is necessary to protect the public health and safety, it 
may require the manufacturer to submit additional self-evaluations of the 
device's risk of death or serious injwy,148 including failure analyses 
and any laboratory testing or other analyses used by the manufactur-
er, 149 any evaluation of whether the reported incident is attributable to 
629, § !(a), 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. (104 Stat) 4511 {adding 21 U.S.C. §§ 360/, 383, 
amending 21 U.S.C. §§ 321, 333, 351, 353, 360c-360j, 42 U.S.C. §§ 263d, 263f-263k, 
263n, repealing 42 U.S.C. § 263b, redesignating 42 U.S.C. §§ 263b-263n as 21 U.S.C. 
§§ 360gg-360ss), "device user facilities," such as hospitals, nursing homes, and 
outpatient treatment facilities, see 21 U.S.C. § 360i(b)(5)(A); 21 C.F.R. § 803.l(a), 
803.3(f), 803. l0(a), 803.30-803.33 (1996), also have mandatory reporting requirements 
for all device-related deaths or serious injuries. See 21 U.S.C. § 360i(b); 21 C.F.R. 
§§ 803.10, 803.30. But reports of adverse drug experiences are still voluntary for drug-
user facilities. 
144. See 21 C.F.R. § 812.25(c) (1996). 
145. See 21 C.F.R. § 812.150(b)(I) (1996); discussion supra note 132. 
146. Such required factual infonnation includes the name of the device, its model 
and serial numbers, the name, address. and telephone number of the manufacturer, the 
name and address oftbe individual providing the infonnation to the manufacturer, and 
a factual narrative of the event giving rise to the report. See 21 C.F.R. § 803.52 (1996). 
147. See id. Under the 1995 regulations, the manufacturer also was required to 
assess whether the event "has occurred or [was] occurring more frequently or with 
greater severity" than was stated in the device's labeling or than was usual for the 
device. See 21 C.F.R. § 803.24(c)(7) (1995), repealed effective 1996 by 60 Fed. Reg. 
63,590 cmt.41 (1995). The manufacturer also must assign an "evaluation code" from the 
FDA Coding Manual to the event See 21 C.F.R. § 803.52(t)(6). 
148. See 21 C.F.R. § 803.15 (1996). 
149. See 21 C.F.R. § 803.24(e)(4). 
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the device and the basis for that determination, 150 the basis for deter" 
mining whether remedial action is necessary, accompanied by an outline 
of a remedial action plan,151 and any evaluations or analyses used by 
the manufacturer to determine whether the event "has occurred or is 
occurring more frequently or with greater severity" than is expected. 152 
Analogous to their device counterparts, the various drug reporting 
regulations require a drug manufacturer not only to include in its various 
mandatory reports factual information, such as the name of the drug and 
the time period during which the increased frequency arose, but also to 
include critical self"evaluative information. For example, a drug 
manufacturer sponsoring a clinical study of an investigational new drug 
must analyze the significance of any adverse drug experience. 153 
Further, the regulations for marketed drugs require a drug manufacturer 
to alert the FDA of a significant increase in the frequency of adverse 
drug experience reports and to supply the manufacturer's method of 
analysis and its interpretation of the results. 1S4 
Another prime example of when the FDA requires self-analytical 
information from drug and medical device manufacturers is when a drug 
or device is recalled. While most recalls are voluntary actions undertak" 
en by drug and medical device manufacturers in "carry[ing] out their 
responsibility to protect the public health and well~being from products 
that present a risk of injury or ... are otherwise defective,"15 various 
factual and analytical data relating to the recall must be submitted to the 
FDA. Initially, the manufacturer will be asked to provide the FDA with 
its evaluation of any risks associated with the product being recalled.156 
Additionally, under the FDA recall policy, the manufacturer must 
prepare a "Health Hazard Evaluation," which includes an evaluation of 
the health hazard posed by the product being recalled and assessments 
of the degree of seriousness, the likelihood of occurrence, and the 
consequences of the hazard. 157 
150. Id. § 803.24(e)(6). 
151. Id. § 803.24(,)(8). 
152. Id. § 803.24(e)(7). 
153. 21 C.F.R. § 312.32(c)(l)(ii) (1996). 
154. 21 C.F.R. § 314.SO(c)(l)(ii) (1996). Further, each Periodic Adverse Drug 
Experience Report submitted to the FDA must contain an analytical summary of the 
information contained in the report, an analysis of each Fifteen-Day Alert Report 
submitted during the interval covered by the Periodic Report, and a history of actions 
taken since the prior Periodic Report due to adverse drug experiences. 21 C.F.R. 
§ 314.80(c)(2}(ii); see discussion supra note 137. 
155. 21 C.F.R. § 7.40(a) (1996). 
156. See 21 C.F.R. § 7.46(a}(3) (1996). 
157. See 21 C.F.R. § 7.41 (1996). 
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While these numerous FDA-required reports do not necessarily 
constitute an admission by the manufacturer that the device malfunc-
tioned or caused or contributed to a death or serious injury, 158 or that 
a drug caused or contributed to an adverse experience, 159 once the 
reports are submitted, the desired confidentiality of any self-analytical 
efforts is jeopardized. Under the liberal FOIA disclosure provisions and 
FDA regulations governing access to FDA records, the public has an 
immediate right to access the nonexempt portions of such reports.160 
IV. PUBLIC DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS UNDER THE 
FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT 
The FOIA,161 enacted in 1966, established for the first time162 an 
effective public statutory right to access all federal agency records, 163 
unless such records are protected from disclosure by one of nine specific 
158. See 21 C.F.R. § 803.16 (1996). 
159. See 21 C.F.R. §§ 312.32(e), 314.80(1) (1996). Indeed, prudent manufacturers 
routinely deny such an admission by including appropriate exculpatory language in the 
reports they submit to the FDA. 
160. See infra notes 161-77, 191-206 and accompanying text 
161. S U.S.C. § SS2 (1994). 
162. The FOIA was enacted after substantial and lengthy debates between 
government officials, legislators, and public interest groups. The FOIA revised the 
ineffective public disclosure se<::tion of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. 
§ 1002 (1964), which bad come to be viewed as a withholding statute rather than a 
disclosure statute. See MARK BRIDGES & TIFFANY VILLAGER, JUSTICE DEPARTMENT 
GUIDE TO THE fREEDoM OF INFoRMATION ACT 3 (1992); l JUSTIN D. FRANKLIN & 
RoBERT F, BOUCHARD,GUIDEBOOK TO THE FltEEDOM OF INFORMATION AND PRIVACY 
ACTS§ 1.02, at 1-12 (2d ed. 1996); AlvinJ. Lannan ct al., Tilting the Balance in Favor 
of Disclosure: The Scope of the Medical Records Exemption to the Federal Freedom of 
lnfomiationAct, 43 FOOD DRUG COSM. L.J. 17, 17-18 (1988); James M. Johnstone, The 
Freedom of lnfonnation Act and the FDA, 25 FOOD DRUG COSM. L.J. 296, 296 (1970); 
Janice Toran, Information Disclosure in Civil Actions: The Freedom of Jnfonnation Act 
and the Federal Discovery Rules, 49 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 843,844 (1981). See also 
S. Rep. No. 813, 89th Cong. 5, 38, 40-41 (1965) [hereinafter 1965 Senate Report]; H.R. 
Rep. No. 1497, 89th Cong. (1966), reprinted in 1966 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2418, 2418-23 
[hereinafter 1966 House Report]. See generally 1 JAMES T, O'REILLY, FEDERAL 
INFORMATION DISCLOSURE §§ 2.01-3.08, at 2-1 to 3-31 (1987) (discussing historical 
origins and evolution of the FOIA). 
163. State agencies are not subject to the FOIA, but most have enacted state 
counterparts. Twenty-nine states have state freedom ofinfonnation laws modeled after 
the federal FOIA, while the other twenty-one states have somewhat different state open 
records statutes. See 15 FEDERAL PROCEDURE § 38:24, at 48-49 (Lawyers ed. 1990); 2 
FRANKLIN & BOUCHARD, supra note 162, state statutes app. See generally 2 O'REILLY 
supra note 162, §§ 27.01.-05, at 27-1 to -25. 
127 
exemptions.164 "Agency records" consist of records that are created or 
obtained by a federal agency and under agency control at the time of the 
disclosure request.165 An FOIA request can be made by "any per• 
son,"166 including an attorney acting on behalf of a client.167 More• 
over, FOIA requests need not be explained or justified; rather, such 
requests can be made for any purpose, and no showing of relevancy is 
required. 168 
The fundamental principle underlying the FOIA is that "an informed 
citizenry is essential to the democratic process.''169 Congress realized, 
164. The exemptions are -enumerated in 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(l)•(9) (1994); see infra 
note 171. See also BRIDGES & VILLAGER, supra note 162, at 3; l FRANKLIN & 
BOUCHARD, supra note 162, § l.02, at 1-12. Agency records also can be protected from 
disclosure by one of three exclusions relating to law enforcement records, 5 U.S.C. 
§ 552(c)(l). Even if the requested infonnation falls within one of the enumerated 
exemptions, however, the exemptions generally are deemed discretionary in nature and 
not mandato,:y. See, e.g., Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 293 (1979) 
("Congress did not design the FOIA exemptions to be mandatory bars to disclosure.''); 
see also 0/P Guidence: Discretionary Disclosure and Exemption 4, FOIA UPDATE 
(Office of Infonnation & Privacy, U.S. Dep't of Justice), Summer 1985, at 3; 
Memorandum from Att'y Gen. Reno to Heads of Departments and Agencies (Oct. 4, 
1993), in FOIA UPDATE (Office of Information & Privacy, U.S. Dep't of Justice), 
Summer/Fall 1993, at 4-5 [hereinafter Reno's FOIA Memorandum] (encouraging 
discretionary disclosures of otherwise exempt information whenever possible). See 
generally l FRANKLIN & BOUCHARD, supra note 162, § 1.14[1], at 1·383 to •392; 1 
O'REILLY supra note 162, § 9.05, at 9-15 to-18. 
165. See United States Dep't of Justice v. Tax Analysts, 492 U.S. 136, 14445 
(1989). 
I 66. "Person" is defined broadly to include individuals, partnerships, corporations, 
associations, and public or private organizations. See 5 U.S.C. § 551(2) (1994). 
167. See, e.g., Constangy, Brooks & Smith v. NLRB, 851 F.2d 839, 840 n.2 (6th 
Cir. 1988); Edward A. Tomlinson, Use of the Freedom of Information Act for Discovery 
Purposes, 43 MD. L. REV. 119, 123 & n.16 (1984). 
168. See Toran, supra note 162, at 844. See, e.g., United States Dep't of Justice 
v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749, 771 (1989) (noting that the 
purpose for which records are sought under the FOIA has no bearing upon the merits of 
the request); North v. Walsh, 881 F.2d 1088, 1096 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (holding requester's 
identity and intended use of information not proper factors in detennining rights to 
access infonnation under FOIA). The FOIA enumerates only two prerequisites for FOIA 
requests: First, the request must "reasonably describe" the information sought, and 
second, the request must be made in compliance with the particular agency's published 
procedural regulations. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3)(A)·(B) (1994). 
169. Memorandum from President Clinton to Heads of Departments and Agencies 
(Oct. 4, 1993), in FOIA UPDATE (Office of Infonnation & Privacy, U.S. Dep't of 
Justice), Summer/Fall 1993, at 3 [hereinafter Clinton's FOIA MemorandumJ; see also 
NLRB v. Robbins Tire & Rubber Co., 437 U.S. 214, 242 (1978) (''The basic purpose 
of [the] FOIA is to ensure an infonned citizen,:y, vital to the functioning ofa democratic 
society, needed to check against corruption and to hold the governors accountable to the 
governed."). During the debate of the FOIA in the House of Representatives, ReP.. 
Rumsfeld quoted one of the Founding Fathers in supporting the FOIA: "Knowledge will 
forever govern ignorance. And a people who mean to be their own governors, must arm 
themselves with the power knowledge gives. A popular government without popular 
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however, that achieving an ''informed citizenry" is a societal goal that 
can conflict with other societal interests, such as preserving the 
confidentiality of sensitive information.170 Congress reconciled these 
countervailing concerns by enacting nine specific exemptions from 
disclosure under the FOIA.171 Because of the emphasis on the "fullest 
infonnation or the means of acquiring it, is but a prologue to a farce or a tragedy, or 
perhaps both." 112 CONG. R.Ec. 13,661 (1966) (statement of Rep. Rumsfeld quoting 
James Madison, 1822). 
170. See I 965 Senate Report, sup_ra note 162, at 38. See also 1966 House Report, 
supra note 162, at 2423, which provides: 
It is vital to our way of life to reach a work;able balance between the right of 
the public to know and the need of the Government to keep information in 
confidence to the extent necessary without permitting indiscriminate secrecy. 
The right of the individual to be able to find out how his Government is 
operating can be just as important to him as his right to privacy and his right 
to confide in his Government. This bill strikes a balance considering all these 
interests. 
Sensitive infonnation entitled to confidentiality may include personal, commercial, and 
governmental infonnation. Public interests competing with the public's need for 
disclosure include preserving the efficient operations of governmental agencies and 
ensuring responsible use of limited fiscal resources of those agencies. See BRIDGES & 
VILLAGER, supra note 162, at 3; 1 FRANKLIN & BOUCHARD, supra note 162, § 1.02, at 
1-13; Lorman ct al., supra note 162, at 18. Even President Johnson, in si~ing the FOIA 
bill, recognized the conflicting principles of disclosure and confidentiality, when he 
cautioned: "[T]he welfare of the Nation or the rights of individuals may require that 
some documents not be made available." See Statement by President Johnson upon 
Signing Public Law No. 89-487 (July 4, 1966) in U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ATTORNEY 
GENERAL'S MEMORANDUM ON THE PUBLIC INFORMATION SECTION OFTHEADMINISTRA• 
TIVE PROCEDURE ACT Il (June 1967) [hereinafter Johnson's Statement]. 
171. The nine FOIA exemptions are enumerated in 5 U.S.C. § 552(b), which 
provides: 
This section does not apply to matters that are--
(1) (A) specifically authorized Wlder criteria established by an Executive order 
to be kept secret in the interest of national defense or foreign policy and (B) 
are in fact properly classified pursuant to such Executive order; 
(2) related solely to the internal personnel rules and practices of an agency; 
(3) specifically exempted from disclosure by statute (other than section 552b 
of this title), provided that such statute (A) requires that the matters be 
withheld from the public in such a manner as to leave no discretion on the 
issue, or (B) establishes particular criteria for withholding or refers to 
particular types of matters to be withheld; 
(4) trade secrets and commercial or financial infonnation obtained from a 
person and privileged or confidential; 
(5) inteMgency or intra-agency memorandums or letteIS which would not be 
available by law to a party other than an agency in litigation with the agency; 
(6) peISonnel and medical files and similar files the disclosure ofwhich would 
constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of peISonal privacy; 
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possible disclosure,"172 courts have applied a balancing test that 
''weighs the magnitude of the privacy invasion against the public interest 
to be served by disclosure" in determining whether information can be 
withheld under one of the circumscribed FOIA exemptions.173 Al~ 
though courts consider numerous factors in applying this balancing test, 
the primary factor is whether disclosing the information sought will 
increase the public's ability to monitor governmental action.t74 
Because the FOIA mandates courts "to tilt the balance in favor of 
disclosure,"175 it is unlikely that courts will deny public access to 
government records, absent exceptional circumstances. 
Moreover, the Department of Justice has undertaken a recent 
"openness-in-government" campaign under the directives of President 
Clinton and Attorney General Janet Reno, who both issued new FOIA 
policy statements in October 1993. Calling upon governmental agencies 
to follow the "spirit" as well as the letter of the FOIA, President Clinton 
(7) records or infonnation compiled for law enforcement purposes, but only 
to the extent that the production of such law enforcement records or 
information (A) could reasonably be expected to interfere with enforcement 
proceedings, (B) would deprive a person of a right to a fair trial or an 
impartial adjudication, (C) could reasonably be expected to constitute an 
unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, (D) could reasonably be expected 
to disclose the identity of a confidential source, including a State, local, or 
foreign agency or authority or any private institution which furnished 
information on a confidential basis, and, in the case of a record or information 
compiled by criminal law enforcement authority in the course of a criminal 
investigation or by an agency conducting a )awful national security intelligence 
investigation, infonnation furnished by a confidential source, (E) would 
disclose techniques and procedures for law enforcement investigations or 
prosecutions, or would disclose guidelines for law enforcement investigations 
or prosecutions if such disclosure could reasonably be expected to risk 
circwnvention of the law, or (F) could reasonably be expected to endanger the 
life or physical safety of any individual; 
(8) contained in or related to examination. operating, or condition reports 
prepared by, on behalf of, or for the use of an agency responsible for the 
regulation or supervision of financial institutions; or 
(9) geological and geophysical information and data, including maps, 
concerning wells. 
Any reasonably segregable portion of a record shall be provided to any person 
requesting such record after deletion of the portions which are exempt under 
this subsection. 
5 u.s.c. § 552(b)(IH9J (1994). 
172. 1~65 Senate Report, supra note 162, at 3, 38. 
173. Lorman et al., supra note 162, at 28; see, e.g., Ripslds v. Department ofHous. 
& Urban Dev., 746 F.2d I, 2-3 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Sullivan, Inc. v. Veterans Adm.in., 617 
F. Supp. 258, 260 (D.D.C. 1985); see aUo Lonnan et al., supra note 162, at 22-30. 
174. See, e.g., Marzen v. Department of Health & Human Serv., 825 F.2d 1148, 
1152 (7th Cir. 1987); Washington Post Co. v. Department of Health & Human Serv., 
690 F. 2d 252,264 (D.C. Cir. 1982); see also Lennan et al., supra note 162, at 29-30. 
175. Getman v. NLRB, 450 F.2d 670, 674 (D.C. Cir. 1971). 
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declared that "[o ]penness in government is essential to accountability and 
the [FOIA] has become an integral part of that process."176 This 
pronouncement of a "sunshine government" was bolstered by Attorney 
General Reno's articulation of Congress's primary objective in enacting 
the FOIA: achieving "maximum responsible disclosure of government 
information."177 
A. Ine lnte,face Between the FOIA and the Discovery Rules 
Similar to the disclosure provisions of the FOIA, which reflect a 
congressional policy favoring open disclosure of federal records to the 
general public, the discovery provisions of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure have an underlying goal of promoting the liberal disclosure 
of relevant information to civil litigants. 178 Also, as with the FOIA 
disclosure provisions, courts and commentators have interpreted the 
discovery rules as favoring broad pretrial disclosure ofinformation.179 
The FOIA was "fundamentally designed to inform the public about 
agency action and not to benefit private litigants."180 Despite the 
Supreme Court's admonition that the FOIA was "not intended to 
function as a private discovery tool,"181 neither the FOIA nor the 
discovery roles prohibit the concurrent use of both systems.182 Addi-
176. Clinton's FOIA Memorandum, supra note 169, at 3; see also Johnson's 
Statement, supra note 170 C'A democracy works best when the people have all the 
infonnation that the security of the nation permits. No one should be able to pull 
curtains of secrecy around decisions which can be revealed without injury to the public 
interesL"); Culinary Foods, Inc. v. Raychem Corp., 151 F.R.D. 297, 301 (N.D. Ill. 1993) 
("[W]here trade secrets are not at issue, common sense would indicate that the greater 
a corporation's motivations for secrecy, the greater the public's need to know.") (citing 
Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. FfC, 710 F.2d 1165, 1180 (6th Cir. 1983)). 
177. Reno's FOIA Memorandum, supra note 164, at 4-5. 
178. See Toran, supra note 162, at 843. 
179. See supra notes 83-87 and accompanying text; see also Toran, supra note 162, 
at 846-47. 
180. NLRB v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132, 143 n.10 (1975); see also 
United States v. Weber Aircraft Corp., 465 U.S. 792, 799-800 (1984); Baldridge v. 
Shapiro, 455 U.S. 345,360 n.14 (1982); Renegotiation Bd v. Bannercraft Clothing Co., 
415 U.S. 1, 24 (1974) (''Discovery for litigation purposes is not an expressly indicated 
purpose of the [FOIA]."). 
181. NLRB v. Robbins Tire & Rubber Co., 437 U.S. 214,242 (1978); see also 
John Doe Agency v. John Doe Corp., 493 U.S. 146, 152 (1989); United States v. 
Murdock, 548 F.2d 599, 602 (5th Cir. 1977) (holding that the FOIA does not "enlarge 
the scope of discovery beyond that already provided by the [Rules]''). 
182. See Toran, supra note 162, at 848. 
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tionally, Congress considered-and specifically rejected-a 1981 
proposal by the Reagan Administration to absolutely bar ~rivate litigants 
from utilizing the FOIA as a supplement to discovery. 83 Thus, civil 
litigants successfully have supplemented their discovery by FOIA 
requests,184 even though the FOIA was not enacted to aid them. 185 
If the information sought is, by statute, public information, it does not 
follow that a p~ can make a successful claim of privilege under the 
discovery rules. 1 Indeed. federal courts have held that the govern-
ment cannot raise a privilege defense in response to a discovery request 
if the FOIA required it to release the information to the public. 
For example, the Fourth Circuit, in holding that a government agency 
could not raise a privilege claim for a document that is already in the 
public domain by virtue of the FOIA, stated that "Rule 26(b) does not 
authorize an agency to withhold any records which the [FOIA] 
commands it to disclose."187 Further, a district court, in ruling on the 
government's privilege claims in an antitrust suit, determined that 
"[i]nformation obtainable by a member of the public under the [FOIA] 
is not privileged."188 
Thus, the general approach in the federal courts is that information 
available under the FOIA is not privileged and therefore discoverable if 
relevant. It would be incongruous to apply different standards to the 
discovery provisions of the FOIA and to claims of privilege under the 
discovery rules. As one commentator noted, "[b ]ecause both systems are 
183. The proposal, introduced as $. 1751, 97th Cong. (1981), provided: "A 
requester shall not make or maintain a request under this paragraph for records relating 
to the subject matter of any ongoing judicial or adjudicatory administrative proceeding 
... to which the requester, or any person upon whose behalf the requester acts in 
making the request, is a party." See also Tomlinson, supra note 167, at 192 & n.3S3. 
184. See, e.g., Jackson v. First Fed. Sav., 709 F. Supp. 887, 889 (E.D. Ark. 1989). 
See generally Tomlinson, supra note 167; Toran, supra note 162, at 8S4-65. 
US. But see Renegotiation Bd. v. Bannercraft Clothing Co., 415 U.S. at 30 
(Douglas, J., dissenting) (arguing that one of the purposes ofthe FOJA was "discovery 
for litigation purposes"). 
186. See4 MOORE, supra note 26, ~ 26.12[3], at 26-224; Toran, supra note 162, at 
849. 
187. Moore-McConnack Lines, Inc. v. l.T.0. Corp. ofBaltimore, 508 F.2d 945, 950 
(4th Cir. 1974); see also Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Coleman, 432 F. Supp. 1359, 
1371 n.23 (N.D. Ohio 1976) ("Infonnation which the government must disclose to the 
public generally may not be withheld from a member of the public who engages the 
government in litigation."). 
188. United States v. AT&T, 86 F.R.D. 603, 635 (D.D.C. 1979); see also Jupiter 
Painting Contract Co. v, United States, 87 F.R.D. 593,597 (E.D. Pa. 1980) (noting that 
"FOfA availability should ... defeat a claim of privilege under Rule 26(b)(I)" where 
a litigant has demonstrated the relevance of the infonnation sought). 
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explicitly intended to increase the flow of information, the use of both 
systems together should facilitate ... access to information."18!1 
B. Public Disclosure Regulations Under the FDCA 
The FOIA requires each federal agency to publish its own procedural 
regulations governing access to its records.190 The FDA, under its 
public disclosure regulations, l!Jl endorses the FOIA policy of full 
public disclosure of nonexempt agency records, regardless of whether a 
requester has demonstrated any justification or need for such re-
cords. 192 The FDA regulations mirror the FOIA and include specific 
exemptions for trade secrets and confidential commercial or financial 
information,193 for .inter-agency or intra-agency communications,194 
for materials that would constitute an invasion of personal privacy, 195 
189. Toran, supra note 162, at 871. 
190. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(l), (a)(4)(A) (1994). These regulations must inform the 
public of where and how to address requests for agency records, of the types of records 
maintained by that agency, of the applicable fees, and of procedures to be followed in 
appealing a refusal to disclose requested infonnation. Id. 
191. The FDA's FOIA regUlations are set forth in 21 C.F.R. §§ 20.I-20.119, 
1401.l-1401.15 (1996). 
192. See 21 C.F.R. § 20.20. 
193. See 21 C.F.R. § 20.61; see also Exemption 4 of the FOIA, 5 U.S.C. 
§ 552(b)(4) (1994). See generally l FRANKLIN & BOUCHARD, supra note 162, § 1.07, 
at 1-133 to 1-183; I O'REILLY supra note 162, §§ 14.01-14.20, at 14-1 to 14-122; 
BRJDOES & VILLAGER, supra note 162, at 52-67. 
194. See 21 C.F.R. § 20.62; see also Exemption 5 of the FOIA, 5 U.S.C. 
§ 552(b)(5). See generally 1 FRANKLIN & BOUCHARD, supra note 162, § 1.08, at l-183 
to I-227; 2 O'R.Err..LY, supra note l62, §§ 15.01-15.19, at 15-2 to 15-91; BRIDGES & 
VILLAGER, supra note 162, at 67-90. This exemption is also known as the "deliberative 
process privilege," id. at 71-79, the purpose of which is to ''prevent injury to the quality 
of agency decisions," NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132, 151 (1975). 
Similar to the policy underlying the self-critical analysis privilege, one key policy 
underlying the deliberative process privilege is to encourage free and frank discussions 
on matters of policy within the agency without being questioned by the public. 1 
FRANKLIN & BouCHA.RD, supra note 162, § 1.08[2], at 1-190 & n.41; 2 O'REILLY, supra 
note 162, § 15.02, at 15-3 to 15-5; BRIDGES & VIl.LAGER, supra note 162, at 71. Even 
the deliberative process privilege, however, is narrowly construed and is inapplicable to 
factual portions of otherwise deliberative documents. See, e.g., Coastal States Gas Corp. 
v. Department of Energy, 617 F.2d 854,867 (D.C. Cir. 1980); see also 1 FRANKLIN & 
BOUCHARD, supra note 162, § 1.08[2], at 1-190 to -195; 2 O'REILLY, supra note 162, 
§ 15.05, at 15-20 to 15-27; BRIDGES & VILLAGER, supra note 162, at 77-78. 
195. See 21 C.F.R. § 20.63; see also Exemption 6 of the FOIA, 5 U.S.C. 
§ 552(b)(6). See generally Lorman et al., supra note 162; I FRANKLIN & BOUCHARD, 
supra note 162, § 1.09, at 1-227 to 1-268; 2 O'REILLY,supra note 162, §§ 16.01-16.14, 
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and for information compiled for law enforcement purposes.196 These 
exemptions, however, may be waived once a record is disclosed to any 
member of the public. 197 
Although drug and medical device manufacturers routinely stamp 
submitted reports as "confidential," this will not suffice to protect the 
reports from public disclosure.198 But when the confidentiality of 
requested information is uncertain, the FDA wi11 consult with the 
manufacturer who has submitted the information before determining 
whether to disclose it. 199 If the FDA rejects a manufacturer's request 
of confidentiality, the manufacturer can institute a "reverse FOIA suit'' 
to prevent disclosure.200 In its FOIA regulations, the FDA specifically 
has announced the public availability of data regarding the safefdJ and 
effectiveness of investigational and marketed drugs and devices,2 1 and 
of all product-related reports,202 subject to the removal of exempt 
information.203 The public disclosure provisions relate not only to a 
at 16-1 to 16-38; BRIDGES & VILLAGER, supra note 162, at 90-107. Such infonnation 
includes information that would identify patients, research subjects, or voluntary 
reporters or other persons associated with any adverse event involving a human drug or 
device. 21 C.F.R. § 20.63. 
196. See 21 C.F.R. § 20.64; see also Exemption 7 of the FOIA, 5 U.S.C. 
§ 552(b)(7). See generally I FRANKLIN & BOUCHARD, supra note 162, § 1.10, at 1-268 
to 1-364; 2 O'REILLY, supra note 162, §§ 17.01-17.18, at 17-2 to -74; BRIDGES & 
VILLAGER, supra note 162, 107-45. 
197. See 21 C.F.R. §§ 20.21, 20.80(b), 20.81 (1996). 
198. See 21 C.F.R. § 20.27 (1996); .see al.so Reich v. Hercules, Inc., 857 F. Supp, 
367, 372 (D.N.J. 1994) (rejecting the notion "that by merely labelling these materials 
'confidential' and 'privileged,' they magically become so"), But a manufacturer can 
request a "presubmission review" of infonnation it is considering submitting on a 
voluntary basis to determine whether the FDA will treat the infonnation as confidential 
and thus exempt from public disclosure. See 21 C.F.R. § 20.44 (1996), 
199. See 21 C.F.R. § 20.45 (1996). 
200. See Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 28 I, 317-I 8 (I 979) ( establishing rights 
of those submitting infonnation to federal agencies to bring reverse FOIA suits). See 
generally BRIDGES & Vn.LAGER, supra note 162, at 202-06; l FRANKLIN & BOUCHARD, 
supra note 162, § 1.17, at 1-529 to 1-546. 
201. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 355(/), 360j(h) (1994); 21 C.F.R. §§ 211.180-211.198 (drug 
GMPs), 312.130 (IND), 314.430(e)(2) & {f) (NOA & ANDA), 807.95 (510(k)), 812.38 
ODE), 814.9 (PMA), 820.180 (dovice GMPs) (1996). 
202. These include IDEreports,see21 C.F.R. §§ 812.38,814.9(t)(3)(1996), MDRs, 
see 21 C.F.R. §§ 20.l00(c)(36), 803.9, IND Safety Reports, see 21 C.F.R. §§ 312.130, 
314.430(e){4) (1996), and ARRs, see 21 C.F.R. §§ 20.IO0(c)(17), 314.430(e)(4) (1996). 
203. If a requested record contains both exempt and nonexempt infonnation, the 
exempt portions must be redacted prior to disclosure. See 21, C.F.R. §§ 20.22, 20.60(b) 
(1996); .see also 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (1994). But the entire record can be withheld if the 
two types of infonnation are "so inextricably intertwined that it is not feasible to 
separate them." 21 C.F.R. § 20.22; see also 5 U.S.C. § 552(b), Infonnation such as 
names of patients, health care providers, and user facilities are not releasable to the 
public under the FDA's public disclosure regulations. See 21 C.F.R. §§ 314.S0(h), 
314.430(e)(2)(i)(a), 314.430(e)(4)(i), 803.9(b) (1996); see also 21 C.F.R. pt 20 (1996). 
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manufacturer's mandatory FDA submissions, but also to voluntary 
reports.204 Furthermore, all correspondence205 and all written sum-
maries of oral discussions206 between a drug or device manufacturer 
and the FDA are available for public disclosure. 
C. Possible Preemption of the Seif-Critical Analysis 
Privilege Under the FOIA 
State statutes and cases applying the self-critical analysis privilege to 
maintain the confidentiality of information submitted to federal agencies, 
such as the FDA, prohibit disclosure of the precise type of information 
Congress sought to make public under the FOIA. Consequently, such 
state laws may be invalid under the Supremacy Clause, which mandates 
that the federal constitution and all federal laws "made in [p Jursuance 
thereof ... shall be the supreme Law of the Land."207 Federal law is 
broadly defined to include not only the federal constitution and federal 
statutes, but also federal regulations promulgated by federal administra-
tive agencies acting within the scope of their congressionally delegated 
authority.208 Federal law not only preempts conflicting state statutes 
Additionally, trade secret and confidential commercial or financial infonnation is not 
available for public disclosure. See 21 C.F.R. §§ 314.430(.g), 803.9(b). 
204. See21 C.F.R. §§ 20.111-20.113 (1996). 
205. See 21 C.F.R. § 20.103 (1996). 
206. See 21 C.F.R. § 20.104 (1996). 
207. Article VI, Clause 2 ofthe Constitution states: 
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in 
Pursuance thereof, and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the 
Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the 
Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or 
Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding. 
U.S. CONST. art VI, cl. 2. 
208. See, e.g., Louisiana Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. FCC, 476 U.S. 355, 369 (1986) 
(holding a federal agency may preempt state Jaw when it is acting within the scope of 
its congressionally delegated authority); Fidelity Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. De La 
Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 153 (1982) ("Federal regulations have no less pre-emptive effect 
than federal statutes."); Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp, 467 U.S. 691, 699 (1984) 
(quoting Fidelity Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. De La Cuesta): Marine Eng'rs Beneficial 
Ass'n v. Interlake S.S. Co., 370 U.S. 173, 182 (1962); City of Tacoma Taxpayers of 
Tacoma, 357 U.S. 320, 341 (1958); see also Pennington Parker Landen, Federal 
Preemption and the Drug Industry: Can Courts Co-Regulate?, 43 FOOD DRUG CosM. 
L.J. 85, 86 (1988). 
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and regulations, but also preempts conflicting judicial decisions.209 
The purpose underlying the Supremacy Clause is "to avoid the 
introduction of disparities, confusions and conflicts which would follow 
if the Government's general authority were subject to local con-
trols."210 Although the federal government has limited powers with 
respect to the states,211 states cannot exercise inconsistent powers in 
those areas in which the federal constitution grants the federal govern-
ment the power to act.212 Accordingly, state courts and legislatures 
have the obligation to guard and enforce every right guaranteed by the 
federal constitution.213 Neither state common law nor state legislative 
action can supersede a conflicting federal law; rather; state laws that 
conflict with federal laws are subordinate and necessarily must yield 
under the Supremacy Clause.214 Absent Congress's express preemptive 
intent, 215 its intent to supersede state law in a specific area may be 
implicit.216 Congress's intent to preempt state law in a given area may 
be implied in several ways.217 First, such intent can be implied from 
209. See, e.g., Wisconsin Dep't oflndus., Labor & Human Relations v. Gould, Inc., 
475 U.S. 282,286 (1986); Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Jackson, 820 F.2d 1406, 1412 
(5th Cir. 1987). 
2IO. United States v. County of Allegheny, 322 U.S. 174, 183 (1944). 
211. See, e.g., Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 516 (1992) 
("Consideration of [preemption] 'starts with the assumption that the historic police 
powers of the States [are] not to be superseded by ... Federal Act unless that [is] the 
clear and manifest purpose of Congress."') (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 
U.S. 218,230 (1947)); Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 746 (1981) (holding that 
it initially must be presumed that "Congress did not intend to displace state law"). 
212. See, e.g., United States v. Gillock, 445 U.S. 360, 370 (1980). 
213. See, e.g., Smith v. O'Grady, 312 U.S. 329,331 (1941); Mooney v. Holohan, 
294 U.S. 103, 108 (1935). 
214. See, e.g., Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. at 751 (holding that state tax law 
inconsistent with federal scbeme ,vas preempted), 
215. See, e.g., Hillsborough County, Fla. v. Automated Med. Lab., Inc., 471 U.S. 
707, 713 (1985) (acknowledging Congress may preempt state law by expressly statin~ 
so); Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 530-31 (1977) (holding explicit 
preemption provision in Federal Meat Inspection Act prohibited conflicting state law). 
216. See Savage v. Jones, 225 U.S. 501, 533 (1912) ("[W]hen the question is 
whether a Federal act overrides a state law ... that which needs must be implied is of 
no less force than that which is expressed.") 
217. See Wisconsin Pub. Intervenor v. Mortier, 501 U.S. 597, 605 (1991) (holding 
Congress's intent to preempt state Jaw may be implicit where (I) the federal regulatory 
scheme is pervasive, (2) the federal interest in the subject matter is dominant. and (3) 
the goals sought to be obtained reveal a purpose to preclude state control); Louisiana 
Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. FCC, 476 U.S. 355, 369 (1986) (holding Congress's intent lo 
preempt state law may be implicit where (I) there is an actual conflict between federal 
and state laws, (2) compliance , with both federal and state Jaws is impossible, (3) 
Congress has legislated comprehensively, or (4) the state laws serve as an obstacle to the 
accomplishment of Congress's objectives); see also Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. at 
751; Landen, supra note 208, at 89-94. 
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the legislative history underlying a federal statute or regulation.218 
Second, preemptive intent can be implied when the federal regulatory 
scheme is so pervasive that it leaves no room for supplemental state 
regulation.219 Third, when Congress has a dominant federal interest in 
a particular subject matter2211 or when national uniformity is desired in 
a particular area,221 congressional intent to preclude state authority may 
be inferred. Finally, state law is preempted to the extent it directly 
conflicts with federal law.222 Thus, in determining whether a state law 
conflicts with a federal law, a court can ask whether it is impossible to 
comply with both the federal and state laws, or whether the state law 
interferes with or frustrates congressional intent.223 
218. See, e.g., Campbell v. Hussey, 368 U.S. 297, 301-02 (1961) (holding that 
"sweeping effect" of Federal Tobacco Inspection Act and its stated goal of providing 
national ''unifonn standards" for classification and inspectiQll of tobacco preempted state 
attempt to classify tobacco). 
219. See, e.g., Chicago & N.W. Tmnsp. Co. v. Kalo Brick & Tile Co., 450 U.S. 
31 I, 318 (1980) (holding plaintiff's action for tortious interference with contract against 
mil carrier preempted by pervasive and comprehensive Interstate Commerce Act); 
Howard v. Uniroyal, Inc., 719 F.2d 1552, 1559 (11th Cir. 1983) (holding that the 
"comprehensiveness and pervasiveness" of the regulatocy scheme under the Federal 
Rehabilitation Act preempted plaintiff's cause of action against a federal contractor). 
220. Howard, 719 F.2d at 1560 (holding plaintiff's state Jaw cause of action against 
a federal contractor for discrimination preempted under the Federal Rehabilitation Act 
due in part to the federal government's dominant interest "in determining with whom 
and on what conditions it will contract''). 
221. While legislative history may express the desire for national unifonnity, see 
supra note 215 and accompanying text. courts may infer preemptive intent absent such 
an expressed desire. See, e.g., Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp. v. State Oil & Gas 
Bd., 474 U.S. 409, 423 (1986) (holding that state regulation of interstate gas pipelines 
"disturbs the unifonnity ofthe federal scheme"); Allis-Chalmers CoI]). v. Lueck, 47l 
U.S. 202, 211 (1985) (holding that unifonnity and predictability are desirable in labor 
contract disputes and thus preempting plaintiff's state cause of action for bad faith under 
Federal Labor Management Relations Act of 1947). 
222. See, e.g., English v. General Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 78-79 (1990); Michigan 
Canners & Freezers Ass'n v. AWicultural Mktg. & Bargaining Bd, 467 U.S. 461,469 
(1984) ("[l]fCongress has not displaced state regulation entirely, it may nonetheless pre-
empt state law to the extent that the state law actually conflicts with federal law.''); 
Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Dev. Cornm'n, 461 
U.S. 190, 204 (1983) ("Even where Congress has not entirely displaced state regulation 
in a specific area, state law is pre-empted to the extent that it actually conflicts with 
federal law.''); NCNB Tex. Nat'l Bank v. Cowden, 895 F.2d 1488, 1494-95 (5th Cir. 
1990). 
223. See, e.g., Wisconsin Pub. Intervenor v. Mortier, 501 U.S. 597, 605 (1991); 
Louisiana Pub. Serv. Comrn'n v. FCC, 476 U.S. 355,368 (1986); Capital Cities Cable, 
Inc. v. Crisp, 461 U.S. 691, 699 (1984); Howard, 719 F.2d at 1555 ("ffJhe touchstone 
of pre-emption analysis is Congressional intent.''). 
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Although Congress has vested the FDA with jurisdiction over the 
regulation of drugs and medical devices, that jurisdiction is not 
exclusive. The FDCA expressly provides that its provisions do not 
preempt state law unless there is a direct conflict between the two.224 
With the enactment of the Medical Device Amendments of 1976,225 
however, Congress expressly preempted states from enacting laws that 
are "different from, or in addition to," federal requirements applicable 
to medical devices.226 Thus, while the federal government and the 
states, absent a direct conflict, may have concurrent jurisdiction in drug 
regulation, state requirements applicable to medical devices are expressly 
preempted absent an exemption.227 
While the FOIA and the FDCA and its corresponding regulations do 
not expressly preempt state discovery laws, to the extent that state courts 
or legislatures act in a manner inconsistent with the public interest 
224. 21 U.S.C. § 903 provides: 
No provision of this subcbapter shall be construed as indicating an intent on 
the part of the Congress to occupy the field in which that provision operates, 
including criminal penalties, to the exclusion of any State law on the same 
subject matter which would otherwise be within the authority of the State, 
unless there is a positive conflict between that provision of this subchapter and 
that State law so that the two cannot consistently stand together. 
21 u.s.c. § 903 (1994). 
225. See supra note 122. 
226. 21 U.S.C. § 360k provides: 
(a) General rule. Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, no 
State or political subdivision ofa State may establish or continue in effect with 
respect to a device intended for human use any requirement-
(1) which is different from, or in addition to, any requirement applicable 
under this chapter to the device, and 
(2) which relates to the safety or effectiveness of the device or to any other 
matter included in a requirement applicable to the device u~der this chapter. 
21 U.S.C. § 360k(a) (1994); see also Stewart v. International Playtex, Inc,, 672 F. Supp. 
907, 909-10 (D.S.C. 1987) (holding that state's common law, to extent it attempts to 
regulate matters already addressed by FDA, constitutes a "requirement" within the 
meaning of section 360k of the FDCA, and is thus preempted). 
227. 21 U.S.C. § 360k provides: 
(b) Exempt requirements. 
Upon application of a State or political subdivision thereof, the Secretary 
may, by regulation promulgated after notice and opportunity for an oral 
hearing, exempt from subsection (a) of this section, under such conditions 
as may be prescribed in such regulation, a requirement of such State or 
political subdivision applicable to a device intended for human use if-
(!) the requirement is more stringent than a requirement under this chapter 
which would be applicable to the device if an exemption were not in effect 
under this subsection; or 
(2) the requirement-
(A) is required by compelling local conditions, and 
(B) compliance with the requirement would not cause the device to be in 
violation of any applicable Teq:uirernent under 1his chapter. 
21 U.S.C. 360k(b). 
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concerns manifested by those federal laws, they appear to violate 
congressional intent 228 A state law prohibiting disclosure of informa-
tion that federal statutes and regulations make generally available to the 
public stands as an obstacle to the efficient operation of the FOIA and 
FDCA reporting scheme. Moreover, in enacting the comprehensive 
scheme guaranteeing public disclosure of federal agency records under 
the FOIA and the FDCA, Congress arguably has "occupied the field" 
regarding the disclosure of such information. 
The FDA's increasingly comprehensive regulation of the drug and 
medical device industry and the "spirit of open government" promoted 
by Congress in enacting the FOIA lead to the conclusion that, to the 
extent state statutory or common laws prohibit the discovery of self-
critical documents prepared by drug and medical device manufacturers 
under the FDCA, such state laws are repugnant to the federal constitu-
tion and thus federally preempted. 
V. INAPPLICABILITY OF THE SELF-CRITICAL ANALYSIS PRIVILEGE TO 
DRUG AND MEDICAL DEVICE MANuFACTURERS 
Even if the FOIA public disclosure requirements do not impliedly 
preempt application of the self-critical analysis privilege to drug and 
medical device product-safety analyses, any attempt to accord that 
industry's use of the privilege either with the federal disclosure 
requirements or with Wigmore's privileges analysis poses philosophical 
dilemmas. Moreover, even without the privilege, the drug and medical 
device industry has other strong incentives to conduct candid and 
thorough product-safety reviews. 
A. Inapplicability Under the FOIA 
Under the FOIA, the drug and medical device industry's desire to 
maintain the confidentiality of its product-safety analyses does not 
comport with the public's right to access government records. Indeed, 
to allow product-safety reviews to remain confidential would undermine 
the purpose of the FOIA and the current spirit of open government. 
Moreover, the sine qua non of the self-critical analysis privilege is the 
need to maintain confidentiality of self-evaluative documents so that fear 
228. See, e.g., Eli Lilly & Co. v. Marshall, 850 S.W.2d 155, 160 (Tex. 1993). 
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of disclosure will not discourage open and frank internal criticism. The 
policy underlying this privilege is not satisfied in the drug and medical 
device industry when the FDA regulations themselves permit disclosure 
under the FOIA mandate. 
Furthermore, Congress, in enacting the FOIA exemptions, already 
exercised its judgment regarding which categories of information it 
believes are entitled to protection. Under Exemption 3 of the FOIA, 
which incorporates disclosure prohibitions contained in other federal 
statutes, Congress has prohibited. on several occasions, the disclosure of 
agency documents that were submitted because required by a govern-
mental agency.229 
For example,230 in 1972, Congress enacted the Consumer Product 
Safety Act (CPSA),231 which empowered the Consumer Product Safety 
Commission (CPSC) to regulate the safety of consumer products.212 
Like the FDA, one of the CPSC's primary functions is to protect the 
public's safety.233 Under section lS(b) of the CPSA, a product 
manufacturer must report any products that fail to comply with the 
consumer product-safety rules and any product defects that could create 
a "substantial product hazard."234 At the request of product manufac-
turers that feared these reports could be divulged to product liability 
229. See generally 1 FRANKLJN & BOUCHARD, supra note 162, § 1.06, at 1-97 to 
1-118; 1 O'REILLY, supra note 162, §§ 13.01-13.09, at 13-1 to -25; BRJDGES & 
VILLAGER, supra note 162, at 44-52. 
230. See also Antitrust Civil Process Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-664, 1962 
U.S.C.C.A.N. (76 Stat) 643 (codified at IS U,$.C. §§ 1311-14), amended by the Hart-
Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-435, § 104(e), 1976 
U.S.C.C.A.N. (90 Stat) 2572 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1314) (Congress ensured the 
confidentiality of documents submitted to the Antitrust Division in response to a civil 
investigative demand by specifically exempting such documents from disclosure under 
both the FOIA and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure); H.R. Rep. No. 94-1343, at 15 
(1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2572, 2609-10. A submitter of such documents, 
however, could obtain such documents if it subsequently became a defendant in an 
antitrust action brought by tbe government Id. Similarly, in the Federal Trade 
Commission Improvements Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-252, § 13, 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
(94 Stat) 374, 380-85 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 57b-1), Congress prohibited discovery 
of documents submitted in response to a civil investigative demand. Other than to 
Congress or to federal or state officials, the FTC can only disclose such documents in 
adjudicatory proceedings by the FTC or in judicial proceedings to which the FTC is a 
party. Id. § 14, 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. (94 Stat.) 387 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 57b• 
2(d)(l)(c)). See also BRIDGES & VILLAGER, supra note 162, at47-48 for more examples 
of federal statutory exemptions under Exemption 3 of the FOIA. 
231. Pub. L. No. 92.573, 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. (86 Stat.) 1399 (codified at 5 U.S.C. 
§§ 5314-15, 15 u.s.c. §§ 2051-83). 
232, See 15 U.S.C. § 2053; see also Frances E. Zollers, The Implementation oftlie 
Consumer Product Safety Act Section 6(b) and the Conflict with Freedom of Jnfonnation 
Act Policies, 39 ADMJN. L. REV. 61, 62 (1987). 
233. See 15 U.S.C. § 205l(b)(l); see also Zollers, supra note 232, at 64. 
234. 15 u.s.c. § 2064(b) (1994). 
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litigants through FOIA requests,235 Congress enacted section 6(b)236 
with the 1981 amendments to the CPSA. 
The purpose of section 6(b) is to safeguard product manufacturers' 
reputations from unfair public disclosures by the CPSC of inaccurate or 
incomplete information regarding a product.237 Specifically, section 
6(b)(5) prohibits the CPSC from releasing any information about a 
product from which the public readily could identify a manufacturer or 
private labeler unless the CPSC has taken reasonable steps to assure the 
accuracy and the fairness of the disclosure under the circumstances and 
has given the manufacturer the opportunity to review and respond to the 
information.238 
Nevertheless, Congress has not created a discovery exemption in either 
the FOIA or the FDCA, although it has demonstrated that it knows how. 
If drug and medical device manufacturers have a true need for confiden-
tiality of drug and medical device safety analyses, it seems logical that 
either Congress or the FDA would address that need. It is unlikely that 
Congress will amend the FOIA to protect such information; rather, 
Congress has increasingly broadened the disclosure requirements under 
the FOIA, while narrowing the exemptions.239 Because disclosure is 
235. See Zollers, supra note 232, at 67. 
236. Pub. L. No. 97-35, tit 12, subtit. A, 1981 U.S.C.C.A.N. (95 Stat) 703 
(codified at 15 U.S.C. § 2055(b)(5)). 
237. Id.; see also Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc,, 447 U.S. 
102, 111-13 (1980). 
238. See generally Zollers, supra note 232. But section 6(b)'s prohibition against 
disclosure does not apply where there is an adjudicative or judicial proceeding 
concerning the product, nor does it apply where the CPSC has filed an action against the 
product to have it declared an ''imminently hazardous product" See 15 U.S.C. 
§ 2055(b)(4)(A)-(B); see also GTE Sylvania, Inc .• 447 U.S. at 122 (holding that section 
6(b) sets forth sufficiently definite mandatory conditions precedent to disclosure under 
Exemption 3); Lamitie v. Emerson Elec. Co., 535 N.Y.S.2d 650, 652 (N.Y. App. Div. 
1988) (holding that the nondisclosure requirement of section 6(b) (5) of CPSA is 
inapplicable to disclosure "in the course of or concerning a judicial proceeding"); 
Roberts v. Carrier Corp., 107 F.RD. 678, 682-83 (N.D. Ind. 1985) (holding that section 
6(b) nondisclosure requirement does not apply to civil discovery requests and refusing 
to apply self-critical analysis privilege to communications between manufacturer and 
Consumer Product Safety Commission). 
239. The 1974 FOIA amendments, in the wake of the Watergate scandal, 
considerably narrowed the scope of the law enforcement and national security 
exemptions. Again, in 1976, Congress narrowed the FOIA's incorporation of disclosure 
prohibitions of other statutes. But in 1986, Congress broadened the exemption for law 
enforcement infonnation. See BRIDGES & VILLAGER, supra note 162, at 5-6; I 
FRANKLIN & BOUCHARD, supra note 162, § 1.02, at 1-18 to l-20;see also Zollers,supra 
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the predominant objective underlying the FOIA.240 it does not follow 
that the public legitimately can be denied access to product-safety 
reviews and other self-analytical information submitted to the FDA by 
drug and medical device manufacturers. 
B. Inapplicability Under Wigmore :S, Privileges Analysis 
Moreover, when Wigmore's classical privileges approach241 is 
applied to the self-critical anallsis privilege in the context of the drug 
and medical device industry,24 at least three elements of the test fail. 
First, a privilege would not exist with respect to FDA-mandated drug 
and medical device product-safety analyses because, unlike the medical 
peer review setting, manufacturers do not have an expectation of 
confidentiality for such reports; rather, the product~safety analyses are 
part of the FDA's public files under the FOIA.243 And the FDA is 
empowered to make public disclosures of such information upon request. 
As one court acknowledged, "[i]t would make little sense to allow 
material to be protected from discovery that was not intended to be 
protected by those originating it."244 Because the public's interest in 
preserving the free flow of self-evaluative information undergirds the 
self-critical analysis privilege, there is no foundation for applying the 
privilege to materials already in the public domain. 
Second, confidentiality of product-safety analyses is not necessary to 
maintain the relationship between drug and medical device manufacturers 
and the FDA, nor would the ongoing relationship suffer by requiring 
continued disclosure of product-safety analyses. Drug and medical 
device manufacturers would have difficulty proving that confidentiality 
is essential to the full maintenance of their relationship with the FDA, 
or that their candor with the FDA, mandated in any event by the FDCA, 
would be sufficiently enhanced by making their communications with 
note 232, at 77 & n.106. 
240. See 1 FRANKLIN & BOUCHARD, supra note 162, § 1.02, at 1-13. 
24l. See supra notes 97-98 and accompanying text; see also McNab, supra note 8, 
at 683-84; Flanagan, supra note 20, at 574-75; Bush, supra note 8, at 639-41. 
242. See Flanagan, supra note 20, at 574-76; McNab, supra note 8, at 683 (arguing 
that Wigmore's analysis of privileges does not support recognition of the self-critical 
analysis privilege). But see Bush, supra note 8, at 639-41 & nn281-83 (rebutting those 
arguments). 
243. See, e.g., Peterson v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry., 112 F.R.D. 360, 363 (W.D. 
Mich. 1986) (refusing to apply self-critical analysis privilege to investigative analysis 
because it was not "performed with the expectation that the analysis {would] remain 
confidential" and had not been kept confidential); Westmoreland v. CBS, Inc., 97 F.R.D. 
703, 706 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (holding privilege waived by failing to treat self-evaluative 
report as confidential). 
244. Peterson, 112 F.R.D, at 363. 
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that agency-communications that traditionally have been subject to 
broad public disclosure requirements-----now privileged.245 
By virtue of being an FDA-regulated industry, drug and medical 
device manufacturers must provide complete and accurate disclosures 
regarding the safety and effectiveness of their J>roducts or face serious 
civil or criminal penalties for noncompliance.2 It is only by agreeing 
to comply with such disclosure requirements that these manufacturers 
have the right tO market their products at all. Indeed, if confidentiality 
were crucial to the maintenance of the drug and medical device 
industry's relationship with its regulatory agency, either Congress would 
have provided for appropriate confidentiality provisions in the FOIA, or 
the FDA would have implemented appropriate exemptions in its own 
regulations. 
While there are no reported FDA cases dealing with the necessity of 
confidentiality of product-safety analyses to maintain a reporting 
relationship with the FDA, several cases under the analogous CPSA are 
instructive on this point. Although product manufacturers subject to 
regulation by the CPSC have claimed that their mandatory self-critical 
product analyses must be protected to encourage full and frank 
communications with the CPSA,247 courts have rejected that premise 
as "a bald assumption," noting that ''this recital is never explained nor 
demonstrated.''248 Similar to drug and medical device manufacturers 
under the FDCA reporting requirements, product manufacturers subject 
to the police powers of the CPSC do not have discretion to report safety-
245. See Lamitie v. Emerson Elec. Co., 535 N.Y.S.2d 650, 653-54 (N.Y. App. Div. 
1988) (refusing to protect from discovery manufacturer's commwiications with Consumer 
Product Safety Commission in part because manufacturer did not show that confidentiali-
ty was "essential to the full maintenance of the relationship between it and the CPSC or 
that [its] full candor with the CPSC ... would be sufficiently enhanced by making its 
communications with (the CPSq privileged to outweigh the benefits of the truth seeking 
process from disclosure''). 
246. See supra note 4. 
247. See, e.g., Scroggins v. Uniden Corp. of Am., 506 N.E.2d 83, 84 (Ind. Ct App. 
1987) ("The need to encourage full and frank disclosure of information to the 
government regarding defective products is of crucial importance to the consuming 
public. The success of the reporting scheme would be severely undercut ifmanufactur• 
ers feared that their frank disclosures might be used against them in lawsuits.") (quoting 
Ashley v. Uniden Corp. of Am., Civil No. SA-8~-2383 (W.D. Tex. July 23, 1986)). 
248. Scroggins, 506 N.E.2d at 86; see also Roberts v. Carrier Corp., 107 F.R.D. 
678, 683 (N.D. Ind. 1985) ("The court is simply not persuaded by [these} policy 
arguments wider the terms of the [CPSAJ.''). 
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related information concerning their products. Rather, product manufac-
turers are required to report such information immediately. Accordingly, 
''the incentive (not to violate the law) is the same whether the informa-
tion is discoverable or not."249 
Finally, the fourth prong ofWigm.ore's test-the purported injury that 
the relationship would suffer by disclosure must outweigh the benefit of 
disclosure-also fails when attempting to apply the privilege to the drug 
and medical device industry. Because the FDA plays an increasingly 
aggressive role in regulating drugs and devices that affect the health and 
safety of the public, the public's interest in the disclosure of submissions 
made by drug and medical device manufacturers is undeniably strong. 
The FDA's action or inaction in response to submissions involving the 
safety and effectiveness of drugs and devices can have immediate and 
far-reaching ramifications on the health and safety of the entire nation. 
As one district court noted, the strong public interest in safe and 
efficacious health-care products is best "fostered under the watchful eye 
of public scrutiny-scrutiny effectuated thro?o FDA ... policies of 
reporting, inspection, review, and disclosure." 0 
Application of the self-critical analysis privilege not only defeats the 
strong public policy favoring liberal discovery, but also provides 
subterfuge for drug and medical device manufacturers by potentially 
allO\ving them to conceal crucial and material evidence regarding their 
knowledge of product defects. As emphasized by the Ninth Circuit in 
Dowling v. American Hawaii Cruises, Inc.,251 information regarding a 
manufacrurer's safety procedures and its response to a particular safety 
risk is invaluable to a litigant trying to prove that injuries were caused 
by the manufacturer's negligence.252 Applying a discovery privilege 
to such product-safety reviews would serve as "a nearly insurmountable 
barrier" for a products liability plaintiff who must prove malice to 
recover punitive damages.253 Crucial information a manufacturer's 
product-safety reviews will reveal includes whether the manufacturer 
lmew of the safety hazard, whether it regarded the safety risk as serio\]s 
or dangerous, whether it attempted to remedy the problem swiftly and 
effectively, and whether it maliciously or fraudulently concealed its 
knowledge of the safety hazards of its products.254 
249. Roberts, 107 F.R.D. at 683. 
250. Konrady v. Oesterling, 149 F.R.D. 592, 597-98 (D, Minn. 1993), 
251. 971 F.2d 423 (9th Cir. 1992), 
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Applying the self-critical analysis privilege to product-safety analyses 
could "threaten□ the public health and safety by posing formidable 
obstacles to the search for truth" in drug and medical device litiga-
tion.255 The privilege not only defeats the strong public policy favor-
ing liberal discovery, but it aiso provides possible subterfuge for drug 
and medical device manufacturers wishing to conceal crucial and 
material evidence regarding their knowledge of product-safety concerns. 
As Justice Brandeis once poignantly observed, "[s]unlight is ... the best 
disinfectant."256 
Thus, tested by the foregoing analysis, application of the self-critical 
analysis privilege to bar discovery of communications between the FDA 
and drug and medical device manufacturers related to the safety of their 
products does not appear justified. 
C. Other Incentives for Candid and Thorough Product-Safety 
Analys~ by Dmg and Medical Device Manufacturers 
The suggested policy consideration underlying the self-critical analysis 
privilege-that the production of self-analytical studies and reports 
would hamper honest, candid self-evaluative efforts geared toward the 
improvement of product safety and the prevention of future product 
detects-is unpersuasive when applied to the drug and medical device 
industry. It is unlikely that, absent the privilege, drug and medical 
device manufacturers, charged with the safety and well-being of their 
consumers, would hesitate to evaluate the safety of their products with 
candor and thoroughness. Rather, the industry has other strong 
incentives to investigate thoroughly and continually the safety and 
effectiveness of its products, the most important of which is the desire 
to avoid products liability exposure with its concomitant threat of 
substantial punitive damages awards in today's highly litigious soci-
ety.257 
255. Eli Lilly&. Co. v. Marshall, 850 S.W.2d 155, 161 (Tex. 1993) (Doggett, J., 
dissenting). 
256. Myers v. Uniroyal Chem. Co., CIV. A. No. 916716, 1992 WL 97822, at *3 
(E,D. Pa. Mays. 1992) (quoting L. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY 62 Q933)). 
257. See generally Taylor, supra note 13, at 775-78 & nn.25-35 (1993) (discussing 
reality of large punitive damages awards, often many times the size of compensatory 
dwages awards, due to infomiation gathered during product-safety reviews); Owen, 
supra note 2 J. 
145 
As the Ninth Circuit in Dowling wisely noted, simply because safety 
reviews may be discoverable does not mean that such reviews will be 
curtailed.:rn Manufacturers have many incentives to conduct product-
safety reviews, and "[t]he most prominent of these is surely the desire 
to avoid law suits [sic] arising from unsafe conditions."259 A related 
incentive for conducting ongoing product-safety reviews is to maintain 
one's reputation in the marketplace.260 
The Dowling court heeded the Supreme Court's warning that 
privileges should be "strictly construed"261 and refused to extend the 
self-critical analysis privilege to a corporation's routine internal pre-
accident safety reviews, noting those reviews "are designed to preempt 
litigation."262 The court declared that it would be "perverse to assume 
that the candid assessments necessary to prevent accidents will be 
inhibited by the fear that they could later be used as a weapon in 
hypothetical litigation they are supposed to prevent."263 
Moreover, even in the absence of confidentiality assurances, it is 
unlikely that safety analyses and investigations will be stifled in an 
industry traditionally regulated by a federal agency that is committed to 
policing the health and safety of the public. It is unreasonable to assume 
that a drug or medical device manufacturer, aware that its product poses 
a health or safety risk, would misrepresent the hazard to the FDA and 
lmowingly continue to market the drug or device264 while facing civil 
and criminal penalties, including substantial :fines, product seizure, 
withdrawal of marketing approval, product recall, or imprisonment.265 
These incentives alone outweigh any harm that could result from 
disclosure. 
Additionally, protective orders limiting discovery to litigation purposes 
will reduce the "chilling effect" of disclosing sensitive business 
information.266 And the evidentiary prohibition against admitting 
258. 971 F.2d at 426. 
259. Id. 
260. Id. 
261. University of Pa. v. EEOC, 493 U.S. 182, 189 (1990) (quoting United States 
v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323,331 (1950)); see supra notes 114-17 and accompanying text 
262. See also Combined Communications Corp. v. Public Serv. Co,, 865 P.2d 893, 
898 (Colo. Ct. App. 1993) (refusing to apply privilege to pre-accident safety review in 
wrongful death action). 
263. Dowling, 911 F.2d at 427. 
264. See, e.g., Scroggins v. Uniden Corp., 506 N.E.2d 83, 86 (Ind. CL App. 1987) 
("We believe that a responsible manufacturer who discovered a dangerous article and 
filed a self-critical analysis reflecting the danger, would cease distribution of it .•. ,"), 
265. See discussion supra note 4. 
266. Federa1 Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c} gives the courts broad discretion for 
"good cause shown" to impose protective orders ''to protect a party or person from 
annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense," including an order 
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subsequent remedial measures to prove negligence or other culpable 
conduct:267 will provide drug and medical device manufacturers with 
protection for post-accident investigations at trial. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
While there is merit underlying the public policy arguments in favor 
of a self-critical analysis privilege to protect comp'a.nies required by law 
to engage in self-evaluation, this discovery privilege should not be 
available to protect product-safety analyses submitted to the FDA by 
drug and medical device manufacturers. 
Under the FOIA, with a few enumerated exceptions, the public is 
provided a broad statutory right of access to governmental agency files. 
Thirty years after its enactment, the FOIA remains a viable and valuable 
means of public access to governmental information. In light of the pro-
disclosure atmosphere of modem government and in view of the 
Supreme Court's warning that courts should not exercise their privilege-
making authority "expansively,''268 courts should not apply the self-
critical analysis privilege as a bar to discovering information submitted 
to the FDA by the drug and medical device industry, absent further 
direction from Congress. Although it may be somewhat unfair to require 
that drug and medical device manufacturers produce to a litigant "self-
that trade secrets or other confidential commercial information ''not be revealed or be 
revealed only in a designated way." FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c)(7). But see Culinary Foods, 
fnc. v. Raychem Corp., !SI F.R.D. 297, 301 (N.D. Ill. 1993) (holding claim that 
information will be hannful to a party's reputation not "good cause" for purposes of 
protective order); Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 106 F,RD. 573, 576-77, rev'd on 
other grounds, 785 F.2d 1108 (3d Cir. 1986) (holding when infonnation may be 
embarrassing and incriminating, that alone is insufficient to bar public disclosure). The 
infonnation subject to a protective order, however, still may be obtainable under the 
FOIA if it does not fall within one of the nine exemptions. 
267. Federal Rule of Evidence 407 provides: 
When, after an event, measures are taken which, if taken previously, would 
have made an event less likely to occur, evidence of the subsequent measures 
is not admissible to prove negligence or culpable conduct in connection with 
the event This rule does not require exclusion of evidence of subsequent 
measures when offered for another purpose, such as proving ownership, 
control, or feasibility of precautionary measures, if controverted, or impeach-
ment 
FED. R. Evm. 407. 
268. University of Pa. v. EEOC, 493 U.S. 182, 189 (1990). 
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damning'' documents that the FDA has required them to prepare,269 
Congress itself has decided that policy issue, and it is not for the courts 
or state legislatures to second-guess that determination. 
Moreover, even without the confidentiality afforded by the self-critical 
analysis privilege, drug and medical device manufacturers have strong 
incentives to perform their FDA-mandated product-safety analyses in a 
candid and thorough manner. Accordingly, the strong public policy of 
promoting public health and safety will not be thwarted if the privilege 
is inapplicable to protect these product-safety analyses. 
269. Dowling v. American Hawaii Cruises, Inc., 971 F2d 423, 426-27 (9th Cir. 
1992). 
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